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1 Introduction 
 
Within the recent history, the world has experienced dramatic events which had a 
substantial effect on the balance (or, alternatively, the “struggle”) between data 
protection1 and security measures. This “struggle” can be clearly seen in the issues of 
data transfer from the European Union (EU) to the United States of America (US).    
 
The right to privacy and data protection belongs to the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of the individuals. Historically, the EU had a tendency to enact strict and 
broad data protection laws. The most comprehensive and substantial of the adopted 
legal instruments is the Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of data (Directive), which 
establishes data protection rules and principles according to high level standards. 
 
There was a similar tendency in the US, especially after the development of the 
Internet and the demands for protection of personal information, but the tragic events 
of 11 September 2001 dramatically changed American life. The terrorist attacks 
forced the US to “barter” civil liberties for increased national security, introducing 
enhanced anti-terrorism legislation. New surveillance and control measures, including 
the collection of personal information, were enforced under the motto of combating 
terrorism.  
 
                                                 
1 The term ”data protection” is most commonly used  in European jurisdictions; in the US, the term 
“privacy protection” tends to be used instead. See: Bygrave, Lee A. Data Protection Law: 
Approaching Its Rationale, Logic and Limits, Kluwer Law International (2002). 
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Therefore, a conflict arose between the EU and the US. The Directive made it 
difficult for the US to collect data from Europe without violating the EU law. The EU 
representatives recognized and valued the underlying goals of the US’s anti-terrorism 
legislation, but nonetheless insisted on compatibility with European laws. The 
“struggle” between the US demands for access to information and the EU data 
protection compliance obligations commenced. The principal issue was as follows: 
how much of European air passenger personal data should be shared with the US 
authorities and under which conditions should this take place? 
 
The first part of chapter 2 of this work examines the actual problem, its background, 
as well as the key terms and legal instruments. The second part discusses and 
analyses, in chronological order, the development of “solution” of the problem 
proposed by the parties: the EU-US agreement of 2004 (annulled by the European 
Court of Justice), the interim agreement of 2006, and, finally, the current agreement 
of 2007. In the third part, different issues concerning further development of the 
situation will be discussed, including the US additional requirements and demands 
beyond the scope of the EU-US agreement, as well as further steps and proposals. 
The forth part analyses the proposed EU system, which is currently under discussion 
within the EU (the plan is similar to the EU-US scheme), and other plans aimed in 
stronger security measures enforcement.     
 
Chapter 3 is a summary of the issues discussed in the work. It concludes by pointing 
out the unlawfulness of former and current data transfers and sets forth the author’s 
perspective on how the overarching problem can be resolved while still respecting the 
United States’ desire of security from terrorists and the EU desire for protection of its 
citizen’s privacy. 
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2 Text Material 
2.1 The Problem 
2.1.1 Background 
 
It is believed that the story of hijacking as a threat for civil aviation and the fight 
against it started in 1968, when the world faced the problem of politically motivated 
aircraft terrorists. As the result, many countries, including the United States of 
America, introduced such measures as pre-flight and luggage controls. Later, the 
Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS) was introduced in the 
US, which allowed automatically singling out certain passengers and putting them 
through stricter controls.   
 
After terrorist attacks 11 September 2001 the US intensified collection of passenger 
data developing the Passenger Name Records (PNR) system, claiming that it would 
be used for the purpose of combating terrorism and crime only.  
 
On 19 November 2001 the US implemented Aviation and Transportation Security 
Act, requiring all airlines flying to or from the US to disclose to the US Bureau of 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Transportation Security Agency 
(TSA)2 personal data contained in PNR of air passengers. According to the Act, the 
transfers of passenger data must be completed before the plane takes off, or at the 
latest 15 minutes after departure. Not only the US Customs, but all US federal 
                                                 
2 According to the US Homeland Security Act of 2002, many of the federal agencies responsible for 
border and transportation security were consolidated into the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS). TSA and CBP are sub-departments of DHS. 
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agencies can have access to these data. CAPPS was then redesigned into CAPPS II. 
In 2004, the latter was replaced by the passenger-prescreening scheme Secure Flight, 
which is designed to compare passenger information against watch lists (so-called 
“selectee” and “no fly” lists, i.e. lists of individuals who “pose a threat”) maintained 
by the federal government in the Terrorist Screening Database3. The goal is “to vet 
100 percent of passengers on all domestic commercial flights by early 2010 and 100 
percent of passengers on all international commercial flights by the end of 2010”4.  
 
On 14 May 2002 the US adopted another law to enhance border security that requires 
airlines arriving and departing from the US to transmit data relating to passengers and 
crew to US Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). It provides that all data 
must be transmitted to a centralized database - Interagency Border Inspection System, 
which also is shared with other US federal agencies. 
 
Due to the fact that these actions concerned not only American airlines, but airlines 
worldwide, including European companies, in June 2002 the European Commission 
expressed to the US its opinion that the established requirements were in conflict with 
the European Union (EU) and Member States’ legislation on data protection, in 
particular the Directive. The latter, inter alia, prohibits transfer of personal data from 
EU/EEA5 to the countries lacking adequate level of protection (Article 25).  
 
Pursuant to Article 25(6) of the Directive, determinations of adequacy which are 
binding on EU/EEA Member States are made by the European Commission with 
                                                 
3 The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 17 December 2004, DHS’ Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking of 8 August 2007, and Secure Flight Final Rule of 22 October 2008. See also: 
http://www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/layers/secureflight/index.shtm. 
4 TSA, TSA’s Secure Flight Enters First Public Phase, 
 http://www.tsa.gov/press/releases/2009/0512.shtm. 
5 The Directive was incorporated on 25.06.1999 into 1992 Agreement on the European Economic Area 
(EEA). Thus EEA member states which are not members of the EU (Norway, Lichtenstein and 
Iceland) are legally bound by the Directive.  
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input from Article 29 Working Party6, the Article 31 Committee, and the European 
Parliament7. But to date, only a few countries, namely Argentina, Switzerland, 
Hungary, Guernsey, the Isle of Man and, for certain purposes, Canada8 have met the 
criteria. 
 
With reference to the US, there exists the Safe Harbour system, which is considered 
to provide adequate level of protection9. The Safe Harbour principles are intended for 
use solely by US organizations receiving personal data from the EU for the purpose 
of qualifying for the safe harbor and the presumption of “adequacy” it creates10. But 
air passenger data transfer lies outside this system, since, according to Article 29 
Working Party Opinion 6/2002, the Safe Harbor principles cannot apply for data 
transfers to government authorities. Thus, with regards to air passenger data, EU had 
no grounds to consider US as a country providing an adequate level of protection.  
 
The US then agreed to several postponements of the application of the rules to the 
airlines established in the EU. From this point, EU and US started negotiations aimed 
at reaching agreement on sharing air passenger data (demanded by the US) while 
securing an adequate level of protection (demanded by the EU).  
 
The idea of each airline being able to negotiate a separate compromise with the 
relevant data protection authority and the US government did not seem to be the most 
                                                 
6 Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data 
established pursuant to Article 29 of the Directive (Article 29 Working Party). This organ consists of 
representatives from each EU Member State’s data protection authority. It acts independently of the 
Commission and other EU organs, but has advisory competence only. 
7 Council Decision 1999/468/EC of 28.6.1999 laying down the procedure for the exercise of 
implementing powers conferred on the Commission (OJ L 184, 17.7.1999, 23). 
8 See, for example, Commission Decision 2000/519/EC of 26.7.2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequate protection of personal data provided in 
Hungary, and other respective Commission decisions.  
9 Commission decision of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC on the adequacy of the 
protection provided by the safe harbour privacy principles and related frequently asked questions 
issued by the US Department of Commerce (2000/520/EC), OJ L 218 of 25 August 2000. 
10 Safe Harbor Privacy Principles issued by the US Department of Commerce on 21.07.2000, Annex I. 
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efficient way of dealing with the problem. Moreover, the EU realized the benefit of 
having a single EU-US agreement rather than 27 bilateral agreements between the EU 
Member States and the US.  
 
Nevertheless, the CBP announced that from 5 March 2003 all international airlines 
had to provide the US government full electronic access to detailed airline passenger 
data on all travellers registered in the airline's computer system. The US threatened 
airlines that failure to provide the requested data after that date would lead to a fine 
and, potentially, the withdrawal of their landing authorisation. 
 
European airlines found themselves in a difficult situation: to fly from EU to the US, 
they would need to comply with either EU or US law, but they could not comply with 
both. They could either refuse to transmit the data thus becoming subject to US 
authorities’ sanctions, or they could deliver the data violating EU law. Since they 
were not in the position to just stop flying across the Atlantic, most EU airlines chose 
to provide PNR to the US11.  
 
At the same time, intensive negotiations between the European Commission and the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) continued, trying to find a formula that 
would satisfy the US anti-terrorist requirements and allow the EU to issue an 
“adequacy finding” in respect of the US data protection provisions. 
 
2.1.2 API and PNR 
 
                                                 
11 See: Ioannis Ntouvas, Air Passenger Data Transfer to the USA: the Decision of the ECJ and latest 
developments, International Journal of Law and Information Technology, Vol. 16, Issue 1, pp. 73-95, 
2008. 
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First of all, we would like to define what actually the subject of the problem is. What 
is supposed to be meant by “personal data” in respect of the air passengers travelling 
across the Atlantic? 
 
Currently, within the US requirements, airlines must transmit two types of passenger 
data to the US authorities: (i) passenger manifest, or, in other words, Advanced 
Passenger Information (API); and (ii) Passenger Name Record (PNR).  
 
API system (APIS) is a unilateral system whereby required data elements are 
collected and transmitted to border control agencies prior to flight arrival, and made 
available on the primary line at the port of entry12.  
 
The collection, storage, and forwarding of API data (unlike PNR data) serve no 
business purpose for airlines. It is solely a passenger surveillance and immigration 
law enforcement function carried out by the airlines on behalf of governments.  
 
The first international Guidelines on Advance Passenger Information were adopted in 
1993 by the World Customs Organization (WCO) and International Air 
Transportation Association (IATA). These Guidelines limited data requirements to 
the minimum required to conduct pre-arrival checks and to those data elements found 
in the machine readable zone of travel documents. After 11 September 2001, WCO 
and IATA, joined by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), revised 
the Guidelines.  
 
The new Guidelines were released in June 2003. To ensure the Guidelines continue to 
hold their relevance, WCO established API Management Committee, which is tasked 
with the ongoing review of the Guidelines and an effort to promote the Guidelines' 
                                                 
12 Advanced Passenger Information – A Statement of Principles, Cairo, Egypt, ICAO, 12th Session, 22 
March to 2 April 2004. 
 http://www.icao.int/icao/en/atb/fal/fal12/documentation/fal12wp060_en.pdf. 
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global adoption. But the requirement that the API elements should be limited is still 
valid: “Required API data should be limited to the data contained in the machine-
readable zone of travel documents or obtainable from existing government databases, 
such as those containing visa issuance information.”13 
 
The Guidelines have been used as the basis for API formats for messages between 
airlines and Computerized Reservation Systems (CRS). But they still have not been 
agreed to by all governments that have, or are considering, API requirements. 
 
At first, the US demands for API were limited. But currently, the US authorities 
request as follows: 
• name 
• date of birth  
• gender 
• citizenship 
• country of residence  
• travel document type, its number, expiration date, country of issuance  
• foreign registration number (if applicable) 
• address while in the US 
• passenger contact information (phone) 
• any other data deemed necessary to identify the persons traveling14.  
 
Demands for the additional information, such as passenger addresses and phone 
numbers, along with the above-mentioned Secure Flight program requirements, 
exceed the Guidelines’ recommendations.  
                                                 
13 See supra n.12. 
14 See: CBP’s Message Implementation Guideline for Airlines of 23 February 2009; Final Rule on 
Advance Electronic Transmission of Passenger and Crew Member Manifests for Commercial Aircraft 
and Vessels. DHS, CBP, 23 August 2007. 19 CFR Parts 4 and 122 [USCBP–2005–0003; CBP Dec. 
07–64] RIN 1651–AA62. 
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 In 2003, in the comments submitted to the US government, IATA stated that “the 
most critical and problematic is the expanded list of required data elements.”15 
Moreover, according to IATA, the actual costs for both the program’s initial 
implementation and data collection and airport operations will rise significantly 
higher than the estimated cost of $164 million, which is “a staggering financial 
imposition for an industry.”16 
 
“The Passenger Name Record (PNR) is the generic name given to the files created by 
the airlines for each journey any passenger books. They are stored in the airlines’ 
reservation and departure control databases. PNR allows all the different agents 
within the air industry (from the travel agent and the computer reservation systems 
(CRS) to the carrier and the handling agents at the airports) to recognise each 
passenger and have access to all relevant information related to his/her journey: 
departure and return flights, connecting flights (if any), special services required on 
board the flight, etc. The number and nature of fields of information in a PNR system 
will vary from airline to airline. There are approximately 20-25 possible fields of 
PNR data, some of which include subsets of information, expanding the total to 
approximately 60 fields and sub-fields”17. 
 
A PNR is the basic form of computerized travel record18, and, by contrast with API, 
includes data from which aspects of the passenger’s history, conduct and behaviour 
can be deduced. Most airlines store PNR in the database of a Computerized 
Reservation System. The PNR system contains all passenger data of the whole airline 
company, thus, the system is not restricted to a specific flight and allowing full access 
                                                 
15 Comments of the IATA in respect of: US Immigration and Naturalization Service Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking on Manifest Requirements Under Section 231 of the Act 8 CFR Parts 217, 231 
and 251 RIN 1115-AG57 (Federal Register/ Vol. 68, No. 2, 03 January 2003) of 3 February 2003. 
16 See supra n.15. 
17 Airlines passenger data transfer from the EU to the United States (Passenger Name Record) – 
frequently asked questions. Memo/03/53. Brussels, 12 March 2003. 
18 Example of PNR: http://www.amadeusuk.com/Training/TrnPNRCheat.htm 
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to the departure control systems and PNR means that the US agencies also get full 
access to data of passengers who do not fly to the US at all.  
 
A PNR is created every time a traveller makes a reservation. PNR cannot be deleted: 
once created, they are archived and retained in CRS, and can still be viewed, even if a 
person never bought a ticket or cancelled the reservation. Each entry in each PNR, 
even for a solo traveller, contains identifiable information on at least two, often more, 
people: the traveller, the travel arranger or requester, the travel agent or airline staff 
person, and the person paying for the ticket.  
 
Most travel agencies also use the CRS as their primary customer database and 
accounting system and store all customer data in CRS profiles. Thus PNR also 
contain data on individuals who never travel by air at all, since lots of travel services, 
car rental and hotel reservations, etc, made through travel agencies, are made through 
CRS. PNR provides a comprehensive and extremely detailed record of every entry 
and show what was entered, when, where, by whom, for whom, where you went, who 
went, when, with whom, for how long, and at whose expense. Through special 
service codes, PRN reveal details of travellers' physical and medical conditions. For 
instance, through special meal requests, they contain indications of travellers' 
religious practices, i.e. a category of data typically referred to “sensitive information”. 
 
There are four major CRS in the world; Amadeus is the only one of them based in the 
EU rather than the US. Each of them has a web site that gives anyone access to PNR 
data, very often with no password at all, just the reservation number printed on every 
ticket. 
 
“But with CAPPS-II and Secure Flight, you need to know: PNR's are the records 
about each airline passenger that are being used USA government's Secure Flight 
(formerly named ‘CAPPS-II’) passenger surveillance and permission system and ‘no-
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fly’ lists, and compiled into the Automated Targeting System (ATS) and other 
databases of the Transportation Security Agency (TSA) and Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) divisions of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).”19 
 
There appear some financial concerns as well. Up to date, according to IATA, the 
cost of transferring API to authorities is approximately US$14 per flight or more than 
US$100 million annually20. Providing the PNR data in addition to API would make 
the expenses, as well as the above-mentioned amount of $164 million, even more. 
Apparently, these costs, imposed on the airlines and other agents within the air 
industry, would ultimately have to be borne by travellers. 
 
2.1.3 Data Protection Directive v. US Law 
 
In order to understand what actually constitutes the problem of the EU-US data 
transfer from legal point of view, it is necessary to analyze the applicable legal 
instruments in more detail. 
 
The right to privacy is protected by the following international instruments: 
• the Council of Europe (CoE) Convention for the Protection of Individuals 
with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data of 28.01.1981. This 
Convention is not self-executing: it obliges members of CoE to incorporate its 
principles into their national legislation. It is open for ratification by states other than 
members of CoE (the US never ratified it); 
• the Directive 95/46/EC (it is binding for EU/EEA member states); 
                                                 
19 Edward Hasbrouck, What's in a Passenger Name Record (PNR)?  
http://hasbrouck.org/articles/PNR.html 
20 http://www.iata.org/pressroom/facts_figures/fact_sheets/security.htm 
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• the OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of 
Personal Data of 23.09.1980. They were adopted in the form of recommendations and 
are not legally binding on OECD members (including the US); 
• United Nations Guidelines Concerning Computerized Personal Data Files of 
14.12.1990 (not legally binding). 
 
In addition, the privacy right is protected by Article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) as well as being enshrined in Article 7 and 8 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (both applicable in the EU).  
 
The US therefore is not legally bound by any of the above-mentioned documents. In 
fact, “a major formal aim of international data protection instruments is to stimulate 
the creation of adequate national data protection regimes and to prevent divergence 
between them”21. The Directive is the most comprehensive of the instruments. It is 
based on the principles established by the other mentioned documents and actually 
constitutes the most important point of departure for new data protection initiatives, 
both in and outside the EU22. Thus the Directive will be analyzed as the principal 
source of the EU data protection legislation. 
 
The Directive’s aim is harmonization of national data protection regimes (recital 8) 
and it requires EU Member States to create legislation implementing the provisions of 
the Directive. In addition, the European Parliament and European Council established 
the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), which is an independent 
supervisory authority that regulates the processing of data. 
 
The Directive applies to the processing of personal data. While the terms “personal 
data” and “processing of personal data” are defined in Article 2 of the Directive, 
                                                 
21 See: Bygrave, Lee A. supra n.1. 
22 See: Bygrave, Lee A. supra n.1. 
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Article 6 provides for strict requirements to data processing: personal data must be (i) 
collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a 
way incompatible with those purposes; (ii) adequate, relevant and not excessive in 
relation to the purposes for which they are collected and/or further processed; (iii) 
accurate, relevant, kept up to date; and (iv) stored only as long it is necessary for the 
given purpose.  Moreover, there are other requirements such as the data subject’s 
right to be informed of the data processed, purposes of such processing, etc. (Articles 
10 and 11), and the right of access (Article 12). 
 
The Directive provides exemptions in Article 13, which stipulates that the Member 
States may restrict the scope of the obligations and rights mentioned above when such 
a restriction constitutes a necessary measure to safeguard, inter alia, national security, 
defense, public security, the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of 
criminal offences. But this article cannot be applicable to the US request, since the 
indication of “necessary measure” explicitly means that these exemptions are 
restricted only for specific investigations, a case by case request, and not to the case 
where the personal data transfer is systematic as it is foreseen by the US Customs23.   
 
The US requests for data access are in conflict with the above-mentioned principles 
of Article 6, specifically, with the requirement that the data controller can process 
personal data only if processing is compatible with the original purposes of data 
collection. Transfer of passenger personal data by airlines to the US government 
agencies can hardly be seen as fulfillment of airlines’ contractual obligations towards 
their passengers, i.e. provision of definite services. The airlines did not originally 
intend to collect data to transfer them to the US Customs (although one may argue 
that without such transmission airlines would fail to carry their passenger to the US). 
 
                                                 
23 Electronic Privacy Information Center, EU-US Airline Passenger Data Disclosure, available at: 
 http://www.epic.org/privacy/intl/passenger_data.html (detailed history of PNR data conflict). 
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Another problem already mentioned in 2.1.1 is that Article 25 provides that personal 
data may only be transferred to third countries (i.e. non-EEA countries) if the specific 
country ensures an adequate level of protection. The Safe Harbour system, which is 
construed to provide adequate protection, is not applicable for the EU-US air 
passenger data transfer. Thus there should be established additional guarantees, which 
could constitute adequate protection. But what actually is meant under “adequate 
protection”? 
 
The purpose of data protection is to afford protection to the individual about whom 
data are processed. This is typically achieved through a combination of rights for the 
data subject and obligations on those who process data, or who exercise control over 
such processing. Analysis of adequate protection must comprise the two basic 
elements: the content of the rules applicable and the means for ensuring their 
effective application. Using Directive as a starting point, and bearing in mind the 
provisions of other international data protection texts, it should be possible to arrive at 
a ‘core’ of data protection ‘content’ principles and ‘procedural/enforcement’ 
requirements, compliance with which could be seen as a minimum requirement for 
protection to be considered adequate.24 
 
Protection afforded by the US law25 is very different to that provided by the 
Directive. While the EU has historically enacted broad legislative protection of 
personal data, the US has promoted the self-regulation of industries through the use of 
broad reaching legislation26. Nevertheless the US Constitution and interpreting case 
                                                 
24 Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 12/98, 24.07.1998, Transfers of personal data to third countries. 
Applying Articles 25 and 26 of the EU Data Protection Directive.  
25 See, for example: Privacy Act of 1974, Freedom of Information Act and the E-Government Act of 
2002, Aviation Transportation Security Act of 2001, the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 and Executive Order 13388 regarding 
cooperation between agencies of the United States government in combating terrorism. 
26 Megan Roos, Safe on the Ground, Exposed in the Sky: The Battle Between the United States and the 
European Union Over Passenger Name Information, 14 Transnat’l L. & Contemp. Probs. 1137, 1154-
55, 1161 (2005); John B. Reynolds, III, View from Washington, European Union (EU) Privacy 
Directive Enters Into Force, archived at http://www.webcitation.org/5WBIN8Xwm. 
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law does provide some protection of an individual’s privacy, however, this is a 
general protection and courts have not yet interpreted the Constitution broadly 
enough to include a protection of information privacy from government misuse27. 
Despite this lack of overarching protection, there are some statutes that limit the use 
of data, using the aforementioned sectoral approach, for example, the Privacy Act of 
1974.  
 
But the Privacy Act only protects personal information when it is processed by the 
federal government. The US has no general law protecting the privacy of 
“commercial” data. Thus PNR data has been considered the “property” of airlines, 
CRS and other travel companies, over which travellers have no control. Those travel 
companies could allow the US government agencies to look at PNR without the 
knowledge or consent of the data subjects. There is no comparable privacy law 
requiring disclosure to passengers of how their travel records are used. Thus, even 
brief analysis of the US law leads to the conclusion that afforded protection cannot be 
considered as “adequate”. 
 
Article 26 of the Directive stipulates that transfer of personal data to a country which 
does not ensure an adequate level of protection on condition that data subject (in our 
case, a passenger) has given his consent unambiguously to the proposed transfer. This 
means, pursuant to the Directive, a “freely given specific and informed indication of a 
person's wish.”  According to Articles 10 und 11 of the Directive, the information 
provided to the data subject must include the identity of the US Agency, the purpose 
of this request and a notification that the data will be transferred to a country that does 
not offer adequate privacy safeguards.   
 
                                                 
27 Arnulf S. Gubitz, The U.S. Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 in Conflict With the 
E.U. Data Protection Laws: How Much Access to Airline Passenger Data Does the United States Need 
to Combat Terrorism?, New England Las Review, volume 39 (2005) 446-447. 
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Nevertheless, in his speech on 16 December 2003, Frits Bolkestein, Member of the 
European Commission, stated the following with reference to this exemption: 
“Simply by telling the airlines that they had to obtain the unambiguous consent of all 
passengers, we could have solved the problem. This regardless of whether protection 
in the US was adequate or not, because consent allows you to make an exception. 
Indeed this way, we could have solved most of the legal problems. And the 
underlying proposition that people must be informed and have the opportunity to 
make a choice is certainly a very valid one that the Commission fully supports. But 
relying on consent alone would have been bad data protection, even if it resolved the 
legal problems. We would have been saying to people: it is up to you to decide 
whether to go to the US, but we are washing our hands entirely of what happens to 
your personal data once it gets to the US.” 28 
 
But even if we imagine that the Commission would follow the “bad data protection” 
scheme described above, there are still doubts whether such passenger’s consent 
would be relevant under the Directive, since it would not have been given “freely”, as 
long as the consequence would be a denial of travelling. 
 
The other exemptions listed in Article 26 do not apply.  There is neither a proof that 
the transmission of the specific data is necessary to safeguarding important public 
interests, nor that the transmission is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of 
the passengers. 
 
National law of EU/EEA Member States, which derives from the Directive, also 
forbids or limits the possibility of data transfers to third countries, inasmuch as they 
do not guarantee an adequate level of data protection. 
                                                 
28 Speech/03/613 addressed to European Parliament Committees on Citizens' Freedoms and Rights, 
Justice and Home Affairs and Legal Affairs and the Internal Market, Strasbourg, 16 December 2003.  
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/03/613&format=HTML&aged=1&
language=EN&guiLanguage=en 
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 But the problem of the US' lack of adequate level of protection could be resolved by 
another method, namely, by concluding an agreement, where adequate safeguards 
could be provided.  
 
According to Article 29 Working Party Opinion 12/98 of 24.07.1998, for a 
contractual provision to provide adequate safeguards, it must satisfactorily 
compensate for the absence of a general level of adequate protection by including the 
essential elements of protection which are missing in the particular situation. The 
basis for assessing the adequacy of the safeguards delivered by a contractual solution 
is the same as the basis for assessing the general level of adequacy in a third country. 
The specific requirements of a contractual solution are as follows: 
 
(i) The substantive data protection rules: 
• the purpose limitation principle 
• the data quality and proportionality principle 
• the transparency principle 
• the security principle 
• the rights of access, rectification and opposition 
• restrictions on onward transfers to non-parties to the contract. 
In some situations additional principles relating to sensitive data, direct marketing and 
automated decisions must be applied. The contract should set out the detailed way in 
which the recipient of the data transfer should apply these principles (i.e. purposes 
should be specified, data categories, time limits for retention, security measures, etc.). 
Detail is imperative where the transfer is based on a contract. 
 
(ii) Rendering the substantive rules effective: 
• to deliver a good level of compliance with the rules 
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• to provide support and help to individual data subjects in the exercise of their 
rights 
• to provide appropriate redress to the injured party where rules are not 
complied with. 
 
But was it possible for the parties to reach such an agreement? Was the US in the 
position to provide data protection guarantees which would satisfy to such 
requirements? 
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2.2 Solution: PNR Agreement 
2.2.1 PNR Agreement 2004 
 
The difficult situation described in section 2.1.1 led the EU institutions to explore the 
possibility of a political resolution of the conflict. Negotiations continued. The 
discussions essentially sought to enhance US data protection standards and reduce 
those of the EU. The intention was to conclude a bilateral EU-US agreement, which 
would allow the Council of Europe to permit CBP to receive personal data from EU 
airlines and at the same time would oblige CBP to provide certain data protection 
guarantees when processing these data. Such guarantees should be considered as 
providing an adequate level of data protection in the framework of Data Protection 
Directive Article 25(2).  
 
But the negotiations were tricky. In particular, the US refused to limit access to the 
data to agencies seeking to combat terrorism. There were also difficulties over the 
length of time the data should be kept. The EU expected the data to be retained for a 
period of weeks or months, while the US wanted to keep it for fifty years. 
 
Finally, in December 2003, the Commission announced that it had reached agreement 
with the US29. The main points of the deal were as follows:  
 
1) the US could access 34 different types of personal data (the full list is available in 
Annex 3 hereto) under a so-called “pull” scheme. This means that the US could 
access the data in CRS directly instead of having the information transferred and 
possibly filtered, anonymised or pseudonominised (so-called “push” scheme). The 
distinction between “pull” or “push” system is crucial. In the context of Directive 
                                                 
29 See: Letter from Commissioner Bolkestein to US Secretary Tom Ridge, Department of Homeland 
Security, 18.12.2003. 
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Articles 25 and 26, one must differentiate between a recipient and a sender. The latter 
can only be the controller30 of the processing operation in the sense of Directive 
Article 2(d), who therefore is bound by Article 25. The nature of the person, who 
does not receive data, but has access thereto in the sense of Article 4(1)(c), is rather a 
controller (of a second processing operation, separate from the initial). CBP accessing 
PNR data through a “push” system makes it a recipient, whereas a “pull” system 
makes it a controller, to which the Directive is applicable. CBP could be seen as a 
controller even in the context of a “push” system, if one assumes that the purposes of 
combating and preventing terrorism and other serious crimes diverge so significantly 
from the initial purpose of processing, that they should be considered as a processing 
operation banned under Article 6(1)(b). Processing by CBP would then count as a 
new, separate set of processing, thus require a legal basis from Article 531;  
2) the US shall store the data for 3,5 years and, in certain cases, much longer;  
3) the arrangement shall not cover CAPPS II;  
4) the US accepted after refusing it earlier a safeguard in the form of a joint review, to 
be carried out together with EU authorities at least every year;  
5) acceptance of redress for individual EU passengers: the US recognized the right of 
EU data protection authorities to represent EU citizens (passengers whose complaints 
to the DHS have not been satisfactorily resolved by the DHS or its Privacy Office);  
6) all categories of sensitive data will be deleted;  
7) a set of processing purposes was reduced from 'any purpose' to ‘combating serious 
crime and terrorism’;  
8) the US promised to use data only within the DHS and not to pass it on to other 
agencies.  
 
                                                 
30 Under the Directive the ‘controller’ must take the principal responsibility for complying with the 
substantive data protection principles. The ‘processor’ is responsible only for data security. An entity is 
deemed to be a controller if it has the decision-making power over the purposes and means of the data 
processing, whereas the processor is simply the body that physically provides the data processing 
service. See Article 29 Working Party Opinion 12/98, 24.07.1998.  
31 See: Ioannis Ntouvas, supra n 11.  
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The deal received substantial criticism from different institutions. The Article 29 
Working Party issued its Opinions in October 2002 (Opinion 6/2002), on 13 June 
2003 (Opinion 4/2003), and finally on 29 January 2004 (Opinion 2/2004)32. In the 
latter, it was stated that the transfer of data to US authorities raised public concern 
and had broad and sensitive implications in political and institutional terms, as well as 
having an international dimension. The following outstanding points were indicated:  
 
1) Data quality: 
• the purposes of the data transfer should be limited to fighting acts of terrorism 
and specific terrorism-related crimes to be defined; 
• the list of data elements to be transferred should be proportionate and not 
excessive; 
• data matching against suspects should be performed according to high quality 
standards with a view to certainty of the results; 
• the data retention periods should be short and proportionate; 
• passengers’ data should not be used for implementing and testing CAPPS II or 
similar systems. 
2) Sensitive data should not be transmitted. 
3) Data subjects’ rights: 
• clear, timely and comprehensive information should be provided to the 
passengers; 
• rights of access and rectification should be guaranteed on a non discriminatory 
basis; 
• there should be sufficient guarantee that passengers would have access to a 
truly independent redress mechanism. 
4) Level of commitments by US authorities: 
                                                 
32 Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 2/2004 of 29.01.2004 on the Adequate Protection of Personal 
Data Contained in the PNR of Air Passengers to Be Transferred to the United States' Bureau of 
Customs and Border Protection. 
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• the US commitments should be fully legally binding on the US side; 
• the scope and legal basis and value of a possible “light international 
agreement” should be clarified. 
5) Onward transfers of passenger PNR data to other government or foreign authorities 
should be strictly limited. 
6) Method of transfer: a “push” method of transfer, whereby the data are selected and 
transferred directly by airlines to US authorities, should be put in place. 
 
In February 2004 Privacy International33, in association with European civil rights 
groups Statewatch34 and the European Digital Rights Initiative (EDRI)35, published a 
report - scathing attack on the deal36. The report illustrated the results of the 
negotiations in the table which is Annex 2 hereto. In summary the report alleges:  
• DHS gets access to EU airline database records even though the DHS does not 
require similar access to US carriers' computer systems and records.  
• The US now has data to test and implement its controversial CAPPS II, using 
European passenger data instead of American passenger data. The European 
Commission believes that the DHS will remove this data once testing is complete. 
This is an unacceptable risk taken by the Commission.  
• The European Commission is now speaking of creating a centralised database 
of all passenger records so that the records can then be transferred to the US, creating 
further privacy and security concerns.  
                                                 
33 Privacy International is a private human rights advocacy group formed in 1990 ”as a watchdog on 
surveillance and privacy invasions by governments and corporations”. 
http://www.privacyinternational.org 
34 Statewatch is a non-profit-making voluntary group founded in 1991. It is comprised of lawyers, 
academics, journalists, researchers and community activists. http://www.statewatch.org 
35 EDRI was founded in June 2002. Currently 28 privacy and civil rights organisations have EDRI 
membership. http://www.edri.org 
36 First Report on “Towards an International Infrastructure for Surveillance of Movement”. Privacy 
International, in co-operation with European Digital Rights Initiative, the Foundation for Information 
Policy Research, and Statewatch, with a Commentary from the American Civil Liberties Union on A 
Perspective from America, February 2004. 
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• The European Commission wishes to see the development of EU-based laws 
that will grant database access to EU member states for law enforcement purposes. 
The EU also wishes for access to US passenger data, but has not yet negotiated this 
with the Americans.  
• After establishing European surveillance laws, the European Commission is 
also seeking to create a global regime on passenger records surveillance through the 
UN agency, the ICAO, thus permitting all countries to gain access to this data.  
 
Members of European Parliament (MEPs) in the EP Citizens' Rights Committee also 
strongly criticised the Agreement. On 17 March 2004 they adopted a resolution 
opposing the transfer of personal passenger data to US. In particular, they objected to: 
• the number of PNR items (34) the US wants to obtain; 
• the purposes for which the data might be used (not only for fighting terrorism, 
but also for fighting “serious crime”); 
• the lack of redress mechanisms for people who are denied entry to the US on 
the basis of the information in the PNR records; 
• the lack of opportunities for passengers to correct errors in their personal data; 
• the fact that a “pull” instead of a “push” system is used to obtain the data, 
meaning that the US does not have to ask for the data but has immediate access to it; 
• the number and kind of agencies that have access to the personal data. 
 
On 11 May 2004 the CBP released its PNR Undertakings (Undertakings), based on 
the result of the agreement with the EC in December 200337.  
 
Despite the above-mentioned objections, the Commission found the agreement 
adequate38. On 17 May 2004, the Council adopted a decision approving the 
                                                 
37 Undertakings of the Department of Homeland Security Bureau of Customs and Border Protection 
Regarding the Handling of Passenger Name Record Data, 69 Fed. Reg. 41543-41547, 9 July 2004. 
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conclusion of the agreement. The Agreement between the European Community and 
the USA on the Processing and Transfer of PNR Data by Air Carriers to the United 
States Department of Homeland Security and Bureau of Customs and Border 
Protection was signed and entered into force on 28 May 2004 (PNR Agreement 
2004). Notably, the most essential terms and conditions of the deal were contained in 
the Undertakings, which the Agreement only referred to. 
 
But one of the key problems was that neither the PNR Agreement 2004, nor the 
Undertakings had any legal force or effect in the US.  
 
With regards to the Undertakings, on the one hand, CBP was bound by them in the 
sense that “CBP takes note of the Decision and states that it is implementing the 
Undertakings annexed thereto” (PNR Agreement 2004, Paragraph 3) and that CBP 
“will issue regulations, directives or other policy documents incorporating the 
statements herein, to ensure compliance with these Undertakings by CBP officers, 
employees and contractors […] failure to abide […] may result in strict disciplinary 
measures being taken, and criminal sanctions, as applicable” (Undertakings, 
Paragraph 44). From the other hand, “These Undertakings do not create or confer any 
right or benefit on any person or party, private or public” (Undertakings, Paragraph 
47). Moreover, as of publication, the Undertakings did not take statutory form in the 
US. To this extent it was questionable if anything, apart from diplomatic 
considerations, could prevent CBP or other US authorities processing PNR data from 
not complying with the Undertakings39. 
 
                                                                                                                                           
38 Commission decision of 14 May 2004 on the adequate protection of personal data contained in the 
Passenger Name Record of air passengers transferred to the United States’ Bureau of Customs and 
Border Protection (2004/535/EC), OJ L 235 of 6 July 2004. 
39 See: Ioannis Ntouvas, supra n 11. 
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With regards to the PNR Agreement 2004, to be binding and enforceable on the US, 
an international agreement must be signed by the President, and ratified by the Senate 
as a treaty, or be enacted into US law. Nothing of this was done. 
 
The question of the Agreement’s validity in the EU will be considered in detail in 
section 2.2.2. According to the European Court of Justice, the Council was not 
entitled to conclude the agreement with the US in the name of the European 
Community (EC). Therefore, the Agreement was annulled and was not binding on the 
EU. 
 
Another question is whether the Agreement was binding on the EU Member States. 
Even if the Agreement were valid, could Member States be affected by such an act, 
and would their national law thus be altered to permit the data transfer? 
 
Ministers of foreign affairs of Member States are, as a general rule, authorised to 
conclude international agreements. The Council consisted, at the moment of 
conclusion of the Agreement, of said ministers. Even if they, acting collectively, did 
not act as an EC instance (lacking a legal basis in the EC Treaty), each foreign 
minister could conclude acts binding upon his own state. The agreement can thus be 
seen as an aggregation of bilateral international treaties between each EC member 
state and the US. In particular, the Council did not act as such, but reached a decision 
as a governmental conference. Thus, the Agreement binds Member States; the 
question remains, however, if it changes their legal systems. Typically, in order to be 
incorporated into national law, international treaties must be ratified by Parliament. 
Before such ratification the PNR transfer is still governed only by national law and is 
generally prohibited. This prohibition can evidently not be limited by Article 8 of the 
PNR Agreement 2004 stipulating that “This Agreement is not intended to derogate 
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from or amend legislation of the Parties; nor does this Agreement create or confer any 
right or benefit on any other person or entity, private or public.”40 
 
Annulled by the Court, the Agreement could not therefore be invoked to justify the 
data transfer. But even if it were valid, could it legalise the PNR transfer on the 
grounds that it provided an adequate level of data protection?  
 
The Commission found the Agreement adequate, but Article 29 Working Party, 
MEPs and privacy advocates insisted on the opposite.  
 
The “weakest points” of the Agreement contravened to the above-mentioned 
requirements of a contractual solution determined by Article 29 Working Party 
Opinion 12/98 pursuant to the Directive. It concerned both the substantive data 
protection rules and requirements for making them effective.  
 
Specifically, the purposes for which the data might be used did not satisfy to the 
purpose limitation principle. The “detail” requirement was not followed, especially 
concerning data quality and data subjects’ rights. The Agreement suffered the lack of 
mechanisms for (i) redress, access and rectification, and (ii) provision of information 
to the passengers. Sensitive data, which should not be transmitted, could be submitted 
in some cases. A “pull” instead of a “push” system was used.  
 
Furthermore, the US promised that the arrangement would not cover CAPPS II, but 
later, the US confirmed that the PNR data would be used for testing CAPPS II41. The 
US promised not to pass the data to other agencies. There was, however, no 
verification mechanism for this promise, neither was there one for the deletion of the 
                                                 
40 See: Ioannis Ntouvas, supra n 11. 
41 See, for example, Answer given by Mr Bolkestein on behalf of the Commission, 11 March 2004. OJ 
84 E/167, 3.4.2004. 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2004:084E:0166:0167:EN:PDF 
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data at the end of the agreed storage period. The “joint review” procedure was not 
clearly specified in the Agreement thus it could hardly be considered as such 
verification mechanism. 
 
But, as we can see, despite these facts, the Commission argued that the Agreement 
was adequate. The criticisms were consistent, culminating in a vote by MEPs to refer 
the agreement to the court for an opinion. 
 
2.2.2 European Court of Justice Decision 
 
On 27 July 2004 the EP brought action before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
against the Commission’s decision on adequacy and the Council’s decision adopting 
the PNR Agreement 2004, on the grounds that they did not comply with provisions of 
the Directive and ECHR Article 8. EP accused the Commission of misuse of powers, 
breach of fundamental rights and of the principle of proportionality.  
 
The ECJ ruled, on 30 May 2006, that neither the Commission decision finding that 
the data were adequately protected by the US nor the Council decision approving the 
conclusion of an agreement on their transfer to that country were founded on an 
appropriate legal basis. 42  
 
The Directive does not apply to activities which fall outside the scope of Community 
law such as public security, defense, and state security (Article 3). So while the 
Commission was arguing that the PNR Agreement 2004 was permissible under the 
Directive (and thus adequate), the decision was also about whether the Commission 
                                                 
42 Judgment of the European Court of Justice in Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04, European 
Parliament v. Council of the European Union and European Parliament v. Commission of the 
European Communities, 30 May 2006. 
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had sufficient jurisdiction to create an agreement on that basis with the US on such 
matters. 
 
The ECJ found that “Article 95 EC, read in conjunction with Article 25 of the 
Directive, cannot justify Community competence to conclude the Agreement. The 
Agreement relates to the same transfer of data as the decision on adequacy and 
therefore to data processing operations which, as has been stated above, are excluded 
from the scope of the Directive. Consequently, Decision 2004/496 cannot have been 
validly adopted on the basis of Article 95 EC. That decision must therefore be 
annulled and it is not necessary to consider the other pleas relied upon by the 
Parliament” (Para. 67-70). 
 
To explain the Court’s logic, we must remind that the EU has a complicated 
constitutional structure. It has three “Pillars.” The First Pillar governs the regulation 
of the common market, where the EU has acquired a lot of power, and the Member 
States have lost a lot of power. The Second and the Third Pillars apply to defense and 
other types of foreign policy (Second Pillar) and fighting crime and protecting against 
internal security threats like terrorism (Third Pillar). The EU has powers in these 
areas, but it is limited by Member States preserving national sovereignty. 
 
Since the PNR agreement involved private commercial carriers, the European 
institutions acted under the First Pillar: the Commission based its decision on the 
Directive (a market-regulating, First Pillar law) and the Council based its decision on 
the Directive, together with its more general First Pillar powers. 
 
But the ECJ eventually considered that the EU would have to act under the Third 
Pillar or not at all. The Court, in its own analysis, put the transfer of PNR data 
squarely in the Third Pillar: the Court stated, without reservation that the data transfer 
covered by that agreement was “not data processing necessary for a supply of 
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services, but data processing regarded as necessary for safeguarding public security 
and for law enforcement purposes.” (Para. 57)43. 
 
As a result, the ECJ annulled both the Commission and Council decisions and obliged 
the Council to terminate the agreement. Data transfers would continue during a 
transition period until 30 September 2006, after which the ECJ judgment would take 
effect. But the ECJ did not consider the privacy and human rights aspects of the PNR 
Agreement 2004, including the conformity of the PNR regime with provisions of the 
Directive. Thus it did not settle the matter. 
 
2.2.3 Interim Agreement 2006 
 
After the decision of the ECJ, mindful of the potential legal uncertainty for European 
airlines operating transatlantic services, the Commission and the EU’s presidency 
were promptly mandated by the Council to resolve the situation by means of a new 
agreement. Another round of negotiations began.  
 
US Secretary of Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff, repeatedly stated that the 
current scheme for transferring European air passenger data to US authorities was 
insufficient to fight terrorism. He demanded for more of the detailed information 
collected by airlines and travel agencies when a person books a flight, including 
phone numbers used for booking a flight, as well as travel itineraries and payment 
details. He also asked authorisation for the CBP, which received the data, to share it 
with Immigration and Customs Enforcement and with the FBI44.  
 
                                                 
43 Francesca Bignami, European Court of Justice Strikes EU-US Agreement on PNR Data, 31 May 
2006. http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2006/05/european_court.html. 
44 Michael Chertoff, A Tool We Need to Stop the Next Airliner Plot, Washington Post, 29.08.2006. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/28/AR2006082800849.html 
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European Commissioner for Justice, Freedom and Security Franco Frattini said that 
he “will try to renegotiate the current PNR agreement under different legal basis, but 
with similar content.”45  
 
On 6 October 2006, an “Interim Agreement”46 was signed, with validity until 31 July 
2007. Since the previous agreement was in effect until 30 September 2006 (pursuant 
to the ECJ’s decision), the Interim Agreement ended a week of legal limbo for 
airlines. It was substantially similar in content to the PNR Agreement 2004 but on a 
different legal basis (Third pillar).  
 
Instead of “European Community”, “European Union” was indicated as the 
contracting party. With regards to the “European Union”, we must note here that the 
EU Treaty does not contain any provisions on the Union's legal personality even 
though the Union comprises the two Communities (European Community and 
European Atomic Energy Community) and two areas of intergovernmental 
cooperation, namely common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and police and 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters. The question of the Union's legal personality 
has essentially been raised in connection with international relations, especially the 
power to conclude treaties or accede to agreements or conventions. The Union does 
not have institutionalised treaty-making powers, i.e. international capacity to enter 
into agreements with non-member countries. However, it pursues its own objectives 
at international level, whether by concluding agreements through the Council of the 
European Union or by asserting its position on the international stage, especially in 
connection with CFSP47. 
 
                                                 
45 EurActiv.com, ECJ puts end to EU air passenger data transfers to US, 31 May 2006. 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/security/ecj-puts-eu-air-passenger-data-transfers-us/article-155680  
46 Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and 
transfer of passenger name record (PNR) data by air carriers to the United States Department of 
Homeland Security, 2006 O.J. (L 298) 29. 
47 See: http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/union_legal_personality_en.htm 
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Although the Agreement did not mention its legal base, it was understood that this 
was provided by EU Treaty Articles 24 and 38. The Council thus avoided the 
possibility of EP to bring action against it (EP cannot control acts of the Council 
taken under non-EC EU law; in this case, in the field of police and judicial 
cooperation). Furthermore, the problem of national Member State data protection 
legislation, as described above in 2.2.1, remained. 
 
The Interim Agreement referred to the Undertakings of 2004, which still contained 
substantial part of the deal (the legal effect of the Undertakings has been discussed 
earlier. This Agreement was neither enacted into US law nor ratified, thus was not 
binding for the US). In addition, there appeared another document, not mentioned in 
the Agreement, in the form of a letter from the DHS to the Commission, which 
interpreted certain provisions of the Undertakings (DHS Letter).48 Although 
published in the Official Journal of the EU, this letter could hardly have formal legal 
effect. 
 
The Interim Agreement, along with the DHS Letter, introduced, inter alia, the new 
approaches to the following principles: 
 
1) Availability of information:  
The “pull” system will be substantiated by the “push” system. Specifically, the 
Interim Agreement Paragraph 2 provides: “DHS will electronically access the PNR 
data from air carriers' reservation systems located within the territory of the Member 
States of the European Union until there is a satisfactory system in place allowing for 
transmission of such data by the air carriers.” DHS Letter states that “DHS will move 
as soon as practicable to a push system for the transfer of PNR data in accordance 
                                                 
48 Letter to the Council Presidency and the Commission from the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) of the United States of America, concerning the interpretation of certain provisions of the 
undertakings issued by DHS on 11 May 2004 in connection with the transfer by air carriers of 
passenger name record (PNR) data. 27.10.2006. OJ 2006/C 259/01.  
 32
with the Undertakings and will carry out no later than the end of 2006 the necessary 
tests [...] In order to avoid prejudging the possible future needs of the system any 
filters employed in a push system, and the design of the system itself must permit any 
PNR data in the airline reservation or departure control systems to be pushed to DHS 
in exceptional circumstances [...] While Paragraph 14 limits the number of times PNR 
can be pulled, the provision puts no such restriction on the “pushing” of data to DHS. 
The push system does not confer on airlines any discretion to decide when, how or 
what data to push, however. That decision is conferred on DHS by U.S. law. 
Therefore, it is understood that DHS will utilize a method of pushing the necessary 
PNR data that meets the agency's needs for effective risk assessment”. 
 
2) Comparable standards of data protection:  
“The DHS will be allowed to share (without providing unconditional direct electronic 
access) PNR data freely with other US government authorities exercising a counter-
terrorism function that need PNR for the purpose of preventing or combating 
terrorism and related crimes in cases (including threats, flights, individuals, and 
routes of concern) that they are examining or investigating. DHS will ensure that such 
authorities respect comparable standards of data protection to that applicable to DHS, 
in particular in relation to purpose limitation, data retention, further disclosure, 
awareness and training, security standards and sanctions for abuse, and procedures for 
information, complaints and rectification” (DHS Letter). 
 
3) Data retention: 
“Several important uses for PNR data help to identify potential terrorists; even data 
that is more than 3.5 years old can be crucial in identifying links among terrorism 
suspects. The questions of whether and when to destroy PNR data collected in 
accordance with the Undertakings will be addressed by the US and the EU as part of 
future discussions” (DHS Letter). 
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4) Data elements: 
“The Undertakings authorize DHS to add data elements to the 34 previously set forth 
in Attachment “A” of the Undertakings, if such data is necessary to fulfill the 
purposes set forth in paragraph 3” (DHS Letter). 
 
5) The Joint Review: 
“Given the extensive joint analysis of the Undertakings conducted in September 2005 
and the expiration of the agreement prior to the next Joint Review, the question of 
how and whether to conduct a joint review in 2007 will be addressed during the 
discussions regarding a future agreement” (DHS Letter). 
 
Analyzing the texts of the Agreement, Undertakings and the DHS Letter, it can be 
assumed that the scope of the agreement has been widened substantially:  
• more data requested 
• considerable weakening the purpose limitation 
• sharing with more and unspecified agencies 
• undefined retention periods 
• allowing for more frequent and earlier pushing of data 
• no guarantees for a definitive switch to the “push” system 
• the virtual abolition of the joint evaluation 
• unclear protection of personal data of EU citizens  
• unclear means of legal redress.  
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Thus, in comparison with the earlier PNR Agreement 2004, the new deal looks 
weaker with reference to the passenger data protection level.  The Interim Agreement 
received much of the same criticism as the previous agreement and undoubtedly 
needed further negotiations and revisions. 
 
2.2.4 Towards 2007 PNR Agreement 
 
Since the Interim Agreement was supposed to be valid until 31 July 2007 only, 
discussions and preparatory work for a new long-term agreement proceeded.  
 
In the beginning of 2007, Article 29 Working Party issued two important papers. In 
the first one dated 10 January 2007 it adopted a standard application for the approval 
of Binding Corporate Rules (BCR) for multinationals wishing to transfer EU 
residents' personal data to non-“certified” third countries, such as the US. 
Specifically, the Working Party's creation of a standard application and clarification 
of the requirements for BCR certification could represent a small step towards easing 
the process's procedural burdens. But the Working Party still has not addressed 
significant substantive issues, such as requirements that could conflict with the 
national laws of non-member states. Thus, only a handful of companies may find the 
BCR certification process's intrusive and procedurally complex requirements to be 
the preferred means of complying with EU privacy regulations. 
 
In the second paper49, the Working Party clarified its position on various parties' 
responsibilities stemming from DHS demand for PNR for all inbound international 
flights. The Working Party required the airlines to tell passengers that information 
about their travel will be transferred to DHS. The Working Party addressed the proper 
means of giving notice of PNR transfer to DHS to passengers who book their own 
                                                 
49 Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 2/2007 of 15.02.2007 on information to passengers about transfer 
of PNR data to US authorities. 
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flights on the carrier's website. It advised that the notice must be “presented to 
passengers automatically, without requiring them to look for it” and then suggested 
that airlines use pop-up windows as one means of providing the requisite notice. But 
the Working Party gave no guidance on whether it will deem notice to have been 
given if a passenger uses pop-up blocking software.  
 
On 26 March 2007 a public seminar by the EP Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice 
and Home Affairs (LIBE) on transfers of personal data to the US and a preparatory 
PNR workshop of the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party on the EU approach 
to a new PNR agreement with the US were held in Brussels. Data protection 
authorities, MEPs, European airlines, and invited academics and experts all stressed 
their concern that human rights and data protection are being bypassed by the 
European Commission and Council.  
 
The main conclusions stated that any future PNR deal with the US must respect 
fundamental rights and provide adequate safeguards. The issues addressed focused in 
particular on how personal data should be transferred to US law enforcement agencies 
in the future. Despite the fact that the Interim Agreement foresaw to change from 
“pull” to “push” system, the participants stressed that there were no technical 
obstacles impeding “push” system and that the contracting parties were called upon to 
find ways to remedy the present situation. 
 
Peter Schaar, chairman of the Article 29 Working Party, stated at the seminar: “Any 
new agreement must of course meet legal requirements, but we also have to look at 
possible technical safeguards, such as anonymising or pseudonominising the data. 
Wouldn't it be sufficient if the identity of a passenger were revealed to the US 
authorities only once their screening systems have found indications for a suspect? 
There must be proof that practices meet the requirements, including the requirement 
that they are necessary, not just useful for the US side. The way to ensure this is an 
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independent audit of the practices, to be carried out jointly by both sides and 
including data protection authorities.”50 
 
Other seminar’s criticized points included:  
• unclear purposes for which the data is used;  
• uncertainty regarding how PNR data is actually being used;  
• lack of data protection in the US;  
• no protection at all for non-US citizens by the US Privacy Act;  
• flaws in programs such as Secure Flight and the ATS, which exceed the terms 
of the PNR agreement;  
• parallel activities that bypass the current interim PNR agreement (for instance, 
the Open Skies treaty51);  
• the number of fields in the PNR and their content;  
• lack of independent review of the current PNR agreement;  
• lack of clear justification for US government access to PNR, or evidence of its 
effectiveness; 
• usage of a program justified as an anti-terrorist measure primarily for general 
law enforcement and border control.  
 
Recommendations from the experts included that the LIBE Committee, EP, and the 
Article 29 Working Party should: 
 
• Insist on inclusion of representatives of national data protection and human 
rights authorities and experts in national delegations to ICAO plenary meetings and 
ICAO task forces and working groups. 
                                                 
50 EurActiv.com, Privacy experts take on Commission over US data deal, 27 March 2007. 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/infosociety/privacy-experts-take-commission-us-data-deal/article-162785 
51 The Open Skies Treaty of 1.01.2002 currently has 34 States Parties. It establishes a program of 
unarmed aerial surveillance flights over the entire territory of its participants.  
http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/openski1.html 
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• Insist on inclusion of national data protection and human rights authorities and 
the LIBE Committee in the current European Commission consultation on the Code 
of Conduct for CRS’s. Insist that the current consent and notice requirements for 
disclosure of CRS usage and of data transfers to commercial or governmental third 
parties be retained, and that the EC begin to enforce them. 
• Insist that the Open Skies agreement explicitly recognize the right to freedom of 
movement guaranteed by Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and other instruments of international law, and that the Open Skies 
agreement not preempt the PNR agreement or require compliance with national 
“security” measures not subject to meaningful independent judicial review to assure 
their compatibility with principles of human rights and civil liberties. 
• Enforce the requirements of the Directive and national data protection laws with 
respect to transfers of PNR data to the US, in light of the lack of adequate protection 
for PNR data in commercial hands, once it is transferred to the US. This enforcement 
effort should begin from a recognition of the reliance of airlines, travel agencies, tour 
operators, and other travel companies on CRS’s as aggregators and processors of 
travel data, and should therefore focus on the obtaining compliance by the CRS’s. 
• Ensure that the use of any PNR or APIS data collected from travellers or other 
data subjects in response to government mandates is limited to government purposes. 
Airlines, CRS’s, and other travel companies should not be given a “free pass” to 
retain, use, disclose, or transfer this data commercially after it has been obtained by 
government coercion52. 
 
As the negotiations of the PNR issue between US and EU continued, during his visit 
to Brussels on 14 May 2007, US Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff 
asked for more relaxed restrictions on the personal data transfer from the airline 
companies. One of the restrictions Chertoff referred to in asking for looser conditions 
                                                 
52 Written Testimony of Edward Hasbrouck before the LIBE Committee of the European Parliament 
and the Article 29 Working Party. Brussels, 26 March 2007. 
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was the use of the data limiting their dissemination to institutions that have strict 
privacy safeguards standards as in the EU. Chertoff considered that in order to stop 
terrorism, the data had to be shared among all US government agencies. He also 
stated the US wanted to hold the data for 40 years but he also said this was 
negotiable. Chertoff claimed that “PNR data is protected under the US Privacy Act 
and the Freedom of Information Act, among other laws, as well as the robust 
oversight provided through [...] American courts.”53 
 
However, it was obvious that the Privacy Act applied only to US persons, not EU 
citizens and residents: pursuant to Privacy Act section (g)(1), in certain cases “the 
individual may bring a civil action against the agency”. But according to section 
(a)(2), “the term ‘individual’ means a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully 
admitted for permanent residence”54. 
 
2.2.5 PNR Agreement 2007 
 
On 23 July 2007 the Council adopted a decision authorising signature of a new 
agreement on the PNR issue55. The agreement was signed on 23 July 2007 on behalf 
of the EU and on 26 July 2007 on behalf of the US (PNR Agreement 2007). It states 
that “for the application of this Agreement, DHS is deemed to ensure an adequate 
level of protection for PNR data transferred from the European Union” (Paragraph 6). 
 
                                                 
53 Michael Chertoff, letter to Members of EP, 14 May 2007. 
 http://useu.usmission.gov/Dossiers/Data_Privacy/May1407_Chertoff_EP_Letter.pdf 
54 Text of the Privacy Act 5 USC Sec. 552a (01/16/96). 
http://usgovinfo.about.com/library/foia/blprivacyact.htm 
55 Council Decision 2007/551/CFSP/JHA of 23 July 2007 on the signing, on behalf of the European 
Union, of an Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the 
processing and transfer of Passenger Name Record data by air carriers to the United States Department 
of Homeland Security. 
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But the problem that this Agreement, just like the previous deals, has actually no legal 
force or effect for the US remains. It has been neither enacted into US law nor ratified 
by the US Senate as a treaty. 
 
With reference to the EU Member States, the Agreement is binding for them, but 
before it is ratified and incorporated, the PNR transfer can be governed only by 
national law and is generally prohibited (this issue has been discussed in 2.2.1). On 
23 July 2007 11 Member States indicated that, in order for the Council to conclude 
the Agreement, they would have to comply with the requirements of their 
constitutional procedures. According to the information of the EU Council, by 19 
March 2009 only five of the EU Member States have finalized the 
ratification/incorporation process.56  
 
The new arrangement consists of the following elements:  
(i) the Agreement signed by both parties;  
(ii) US letter to EU (DHS letter) giving assurances on the way it intends to 
protect PNR data; and  
(iii) EU letter to US, which is a reply letter from the EU acknowledging receipt 
of the assurances and confirming that on the basis of the assurances it considers the 
level of protection of PNR data in the US as adequate.  
 
Notwithstanding the validity of the Agreement for the US mentioned above, formally 
the Agreement is a treaty. But what is the legal status of the letters?  
 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 provides for a document to be 
considered a treaty “whatever its particular designation” (Article 2). According to 
                                                 
56 Council Decision  5311/1/09 of 19 March 2009 on Agreement between the European Union and the 
United States of America on the processing and transfer of passenger name record (PNR) data by air 
carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) - Declarations made in 
accordance with Article 24 (5) TEU – State of Play. 
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Article 11, the consent of a State to be bound by a treaty may be expressed, inter alia, 
by exchange of instruments constituting a treaty. 
 
Furthermore, Article 13 stipulates that “The consent of States to be bound by a treaty 
constituted by instruments exchanged between them is expressed by that exchange 
when: (a) the instruments provide that their exchange shall have that effect; or (b) it is 
otherwise established that those States were agreed that the exchange of instruments 
should have that effect”. 
 
In practice, if the instruments exchange is not meant to be binding, the words 
“understanding” and “arrangements” are used instead. In our case, we can find neither 
the classic phrases to indicate that the letters constitute a treaty, nor the classic 
phrases to indicate that they do not. Thus, to determine whether the letters are 
intended to be binding, the text of the Agreement should be analyzed. 
 
The Agreement gives reference to the DHS letter in Paragraph 1, but does not state 
that the US shall implement the safeguards in the letter. It only states that the US shall 
process PNR data in accordance with domestic law (Paragraph 3). The agreement can 
be denounced by the EU if the EU determines that the US has breached it (Paragraph 
3); there is no explicit reference to the US breaching the safeguards in the DHS letter.  
 
“It seems clear that the parties wished to leave the legal effect of the letter ambiguous, 
or that they could not agree on the precise legal status of the letter. The best view, 
although the issue is far from doubt, is that the parties have agreed that the letter, 
while not binding in itself, is closely connected to the operation of the treaty, as it is 
an express condition of entering into the agreement (on the EU side) and will be 
revoked in the event of a breach of the agreement by the EU (on the US side). It also 
appears implicitly that if the safeguards in the letter are not applied in practice, in the 
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view of the EU, then the EU will consider that this is valid grounds to denounce the 
treaty” 57.  
 
Therefore we cannot state that the letters are legally binding. It is more accurate to 
say that they have an indirect legal force, since the EU has entered into the treaty on 
the basis of the assurances in the DHS letter explaining its safeguarding of PNR. 
 
The key points of the deal are as follows. 
 
DHS letter Paragraph I provides that “DHS uses EU PNR strictly for the purpose of 
preventing and combating: (1) terrorism and related crimes; (2) other serious crimes, 
including organized crime, that are transnational in nature; and (3) flight from 
warrants or custody for crimes described above. PNR may be used where necessary 
for the protection of the vital interests of the data subject or other persons, or in any 
criminal judicial proceedings, or as otherwise required by law”. As we can see from 
this text, the list of purposes is not limited at all. 
 
DHS can share PNR data with “other domestic government authorities with law 
enforcement, public security, or counterterrorism functions, in support of 
counterterrorism, transnational crime and public security related cases (including 
threats, flights, individuals and routes of concern) they are examining or 
investigating, according to law, and pursuant to written understandings and US law 
on the exchange of information between US government authorities” (DHS letter 
Paragraph II). Again, the list of authorities is not limited. 
 
The dataset was reduced from 34 to 19 elements (the full list is available in Annex 3 
hereto). But the reduction is largely cosmetic due to the merging of data fields instead 
                                                 
57 Steve Peers, The legal status of the Agreement and letters, Statewatch, 3 July 2007. 
 http://www.statewatch.org/news/2007/jul/03eu-pnr.htm 
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of actual deletion. See, for example, DHS letter Paragraph II, line 7: ”All available 
contact information (including originator information)”. Previously (Undertakings 
2004, Attachment ”A”) they constituted  4 separate data items:  
• 6. Address,  
• 9. Contact telephone numbers,  
• 17. E-mail address, 
• 28. Received from information.  
The same concerns lines 8, 10, 14, 16 and 17. 
 
With regards to sensitive data, it is stated that “DHS employs an automated system 
which filters those sensitive PNR codes and terms and does not use this information” 
(DHS letter Paragraph III). But the same paragraph provides that the sensitive data 
can be accessed for an exceptional case: “If necessary, in an exceptional case where 
the life of a data subject or of others could be imperiled or seriously impaired”. 
 
It was claimed that for the first time that EU citizens would also be covered by the US 
Privacy Act which meant they could enforce their rights in US courts (DHS letter 
Paragraph IV)58.  
 
The US is allowed to store the data in an active analytical database for seven years, 
after which time the data will be moved to dormant, non-operational status and can be 
accessible under stricter rules. This means a 15 year storage period in total as 
compared to three years as previously agreed (DHS letter Paragraph VII).  
 
PNR Agreement 2007 received harsh criticism from the EP, Article 29 Working 
Party, EDPS, as well as on the national level.  
 
                                                 
58 However, on 22.08.2007 the US announced changes in the Privacy Act that gave exemptions from 
responding to requests for personal information held to DHS and ATS (see 2.3.1). 
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In a letter dated 27 June 2007 to the German interior minister Wolfgang Schauble, 
EDPS Peter Hustinx showed concern arguing that the privacy rights of air passengers 
between the EU and US will be threatened by the new agreement. On 12 July 2007 
the EP adopted a Resolution59 that heavily criticized the new PNR agreement, 
considering it “substantively flawed”, in particular by “open and vague definitions 
and multiple possibilities for exception”. EP stated that the agreement “had been 
concluded without any involvement of the EP, lacking democratic oversight of any 
kind”. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party issued an opinion on the new PNR 
agreement, which concluded that “in general, the safeguards provided for under the 
previous agreement have been markedly weakened”, and “the new agreement leaves 
open serious questions and shortcomings, and contains too many emergency 
exceptions”.60 The Working Party, as an official EU data protection advisory body, 
had not been consulted or asked for advice on the data protection elements of the 
agreement. Moreover, the Directive on API61 and the EU's PNR agreements with 
Australia62 and Canada63, which ensure higher standards of protection of personal 
data, have not been taken into account while negotiating the Agreement. 
 
In summary, the weak points of the Agreement are:  
 
                                                 
59 European Parliament resolution of 12 July 2007 on the PNR agreement with the United States of 
America. 
60 Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 5/2007 of 17.08.2007 on the follow-up agreement between the 
European Union and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of passenger name 
record (PNR) data by air carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security concluded in 
July 2007. 
61 Council Directive 2004/82/EC of 29 April 2004 on the obligation of carriers to communicate 
passenger data. 
62 Agreement between the European Union and Australia on the processing and transfer of European 
Union-sourced passenger name record (PNR) data by air carriers to the Australian Customs Service. 
8.8.2008. Official Journal of the European Union (L 213/51). 
63 Agreement between the European Community and the Government of Canada on the processing of 
Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data. 21.3.2006. Official Journal of the 
European Union (L 82/15). 
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• Lack of legal certainty: the handling, collection, use and storage of personal 
data from air passengers by DHS is not founded on a legal agreement but on non-
binding assurances remitted in a letter.  
• The new agreement states that it applies to airlines operating to and from the 
US. It is not clear whether this includes, for example, airlines operating from a third 
country who transit through the EU. It is not clear where the limits are of EU 
jurisdiction. Is it the processing operation or the data controller who is based in the 
EU? 
• Lack of purpose-limitation: PNR transfer is not limited to fighting terrorism; it 
can also be used for other “unspecified additional purposes” by the US government.  
• Despite the willingness of the DHS to move to the “push” system no later than 
1 January 2008 in principle, the shift – already foreseen in the 2004 PNR agreement – 
has been delayed for years, even though the condition of technical feasibility has long 
since been met. The “push” system for all carriers should be a sine qua non for PNR 
transfers. But it remains unclear if and under what conditions this new method of 
transfer will eventually be worked out. It also remains unclear how DHS, allowed in 
exceptional cases to retrieve data other than those listed, may access such data after 
the transition from a “pull” to a “push” system.  
• Joint periodical review by DHS and EU does not provide any involvement of 
EDPS or national data protection supervisors, which was provided for under the 
previous PNR agreement. It remains unclear when and under what circumstances a 
joint review will take place. The agreement does not foresee any mechanism aimed at 
resolving disputes, leaving it up to the contracting parties. This is particularly relevant 
for a joint review. 
• Since passengers must be properly informed of the use of their data and their 
rights, and that this obligation rests with the airlines, DHS and the Commission must 
take responsibility for the information provided to passengers and the “Short notice 
for travel between EU and US” must be made available to all passengers. 
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• Despite the fact that the US Privacy Act will be extended administratively to 
EU citizens, DHS reserves the right to introduce exemptions under the Freedom of 
Information Act. EU citizens' PNR data are to be treated solely according to US law, 
without an adequacy assessment or any indication of the specific US legislation 
applicable. Thus the absence of a robust legal mechanism that enables EU citizens to 
challenge misuse of their personal information. 
• Extension of the time the data are kept, introducing a concept of “dormant” 
data. Data can be retained for longer periods with the new agreement - from 3,5 years 
to 15 and the period might be even longer. There is no guarantee that the data will be 
definitively deleted after the 15 year period. Besides that, PNR data will be kept for 
seven years in “active analytical databases”, leading to a big risk of massive profiling 
and data mining, contrary to EU principles.  
• The reduction of PNR data fields from 34 to 19 is cosmetic. Moreover, the 
elements include information on third parties other than the data subject. 
• Sensitive data will be made available and can be used by DHS in exceptional 
cases, which was excluded by the previous agreement. In addition, the filtering of 
sensitive data continues to be done by DHS even with a “push” system. 
• Apart from “exceptional cases”, sensitive data can be contained within the 
mandatory 19 fields of data. DHS letter Paragraph II, Line 17 (“OSI, SSI and SSR 
information”) can include such items as special meal requests, which can give an idea 
about religious beliefs of the passenger and thus constitute sensitive data. 
• The agreement fails to define precisely which US authorities may access the 
data.  
• There is no limitation to what US authorities are allowed to do with the data.  
• The data regime of onward transfers by third agencies to other units is unclear. 
• The envisaged transfer of analytical information flowing from PNR data from 
the US authorities to police and judicial authorities in the Member States, and 
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possibly to Europol64 and Eurojust65, outside the framework of specific judicial 
procedures or police investigations, as mentioned in the DHS letter. This should only 
be allowed in accordance with the existing EU-US agreements on mutual legal 
assistance and extradition.  
• Third countries may be given access to PNR data if adhering to DHS-
specified conditions, and that third countries may exceptionally, in unspecified 
emergency cases, be given access to PNR data without assurances that the data will 
be handled according to the DHS level of data protection. Moreover, EU has accepted 
'not to interfere' with regard to the protection of EU citizens' PNR data that may be 
shared by the US with third countries. 
• The agreement runs the risk that that any change in US legislation might 
unilaterally affect the level of data protection as foreseen in the PNR agreement66. 
• It is unclear what the effects of the provisions on reciprocity mean for the 
level of data protection in any EU PNR regime. Art. 5 of the new agreement and 
Article IX of the DHS letter (on reciprocity) contain an ambiguous statement about 
the US side’s expectations of the data protection measures applied to both the US and 
any future EU PNR regime. While it is expected that this means that the US does not 
expect lower standards in a future EU PNR regime than the ones in the new 
agreement, it could also be interpreted as meaning that the DHS is asking the EU not 
to put in place higher data protection standards in an EU PNR regime, or they will 
suspend the agreement.  
• The Agreement regulates PNR, but not API. Initially, API contained few data 
types and were used solely for air transportation purposes. Their transfer could thus 
rest on Article 26(1)(b) of the Directive (performance of the transportation contract 
                                                 
64 Europol is the European Law Enforcement Organisation which aims at improving the effectiveness 
and co-operation of the competent authorities in the Member States in preventing and combating 
terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking and other serious forms of international organised crime. 
http://www.europol.europa.eu/ 
65 Eurojust is a EU body established in 2002 to enhance the effectiveness of the competent authorities 
within Member States when they are dealing with the investigation and prosecution of serious cross-
border and organised crime. http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/ 
66 See section 2.3.1. 
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between data subjects and carriers). However, since 2001 the amount of API 
increased and their processing purpose was extended to include public security. The 
content of API became similar to PNR. The former allow the tracing of the routes of 
European passengers in a manner just as precise as the latter; nevertheless, no privacy 
protection guarantees are given in respect to API67.  
 
Therefore new deal still failed to offer an adequate level of data protection and left 
many problems open. 
                                                 
67 See: Ioannis Ntouvas, supra n 11. 
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2.3 After Agreement Phase 
2.3.1 Further Requests from the US 
 
Just seven days after the PNR Agreement 2007 was signed, the US government wrote 
to the EU Council asking it to agree that the negotiations and all the negotiating 
documents (including e-mails) leading to the agreement be kept secret for at least ten 
years after the entry into force of the agreement68.  
 
The EU reply said that “the European Union shares your understanding regarding the 
confidentiality of the negotiation process”69. Moreover, it added that “Article 4, 
paragraph 1(a), third indent of the Regulation 1049/2001 obliges the institutions to 
refuse public access to a document where disclosure would undermine the protection 
of the public interest as regards international relations”, while any request for access 
to a document “must be examined and replied to on a case-by-case basis. Obviously, 
such a request will always be evaluated in good faith, keeping in mind the US 
expectations regarding confidentiality of negotiation documents, as expressed in your 
letter of 30 July 2007, and with due regard for the applicable EU legislation.” In other 
words, people can apply for these documents and the request will be examined “with 
due regard for the applicable EU legislation” in the context of “US expectations”. 
 
Article 4.4 of the Regulation deals expressly with access to documents from third 
parties (i.e. non-EU states like the US). This says that the institution (the Council) 
shall “consult the third party with a view to assessing whether an exception in 
                                                 
68 The letter from Paul Rosenzweig, Acting Assistant Secretary for Policy at the DHS, to the EU 
Council Presidency, 30 July 2007. EU doc no: 12307/07. 
69 Council Decision 12309/07 of 31 August 2007 on Agreement between the European Union and the 
United States of America on the processing and transfer of passenger name record (PNR) data by air 
carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) - Letter on confidentiality of 
negotiation documents. 
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paragraph 1 or 2 is applicable, unless it is clear that the document shall or shall not be 
disclosed”. 
 
How the EU intends to effect this commitment to refuse access on the grounds of “the 
public interest as regard international relations” is not clear. Already the Council's 
own public register of documents gives access many full-texts of documents falling 
under this so-called confidentiality rule. Are these documents going to be removed?70 
 
Furthermore, on 22 August 2007 the US government announced some changes in its 
Privacy Act that gave exemptions from responding to request for personal 
information held to DHS and ATS71. 
 
The exemptions related to the new Arrival and Departure System (ADIS) that the US 
was to introduce. ADIS is intended to authorise people to travel only after PNR and 
API data has been checked and cleared by the US watch lists. “DHS is republishing 
the Privacy Act system of records notice for ADIS in order to expand its authority 
and capability to serve additional programs that require information on individuals 
throughout the immigrant and non-immigrant pre-entry, entry, status management, 
and exit processes.”72 
 
There were also changes to the rules under the US Privacy Act to exempt ATS73. 
Although created to combat terrorism, the ATS covers “other crimes” and any 
activity in violation of the US law. ATS maintains PNR and the use of PNR data is 
explicit. 
 
                                                 
70 Statewatch, US demands 10 year ban on access to PNR documents, 2.09.2007. 
 http://www.statewatch.org/news/2007/sep/02eu-usa-pnr-secret.htm. 
71 Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of Exemptions; Redress and Response Records System. 
Federal Register: 18 January 2007 (Volume 72, Number 11). 
72 Proposed Rules, Federal Register - DHS, 6 CFR Part 5, Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of 
Exemptions, 22.08.2007. 
73 See supra n 71. 
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The exemptions seem to be meant to counterbalance “the set backs” for the US 
government in the 2007 PNR Agreement. When the agreement was signed the 
Council and the Commission relied upon the extension of protections in the US 
Privacy Act to travellers from the EU (see). In DHS letter Paragraph IV it is stated 
that DHS has taken the decision “to extend administrative Privacy Act protections to 
PNR data stored in the ATS regardless of the nationality or country of residence of 
the data subject, including data that relates to European citizens. Consistent with US 
law, DHS also maintains a system accessible by individuals, regardless of their 
nationality or country of residence, for providing redress to persons seeking 
information about or correction of PNR.” The introduced exemptions contradict this 
statement. 
 
“The adoption of these two exemptions will seriously diminish any rights EU citizens 
have to find out what data is held on them and who it is held by. Did the Council and 
the Commission, who negotiated the agreement, know the US was planning to 
introduce them, and if not why not? […] Yet again we see the US telling the EU what 
to do. […] US access to PNR data and its further processing is an issue of substantial 
public interest which directly effects the rights and privacy of EU citizens and 
therefore all the documentation should be in the public domain for parliaments and 
people to see and discuss. It is a quite outrageous request and it is even more 
outrageous that the EU is going to agree to it,” stated Tony Bunyan, Statewatch editor 
74. 
 
2.3.2 Move Away from Single Approach 
 
Just after six months after signing PNR Agreement 2007, the US attempted to force 
countries like Greece, the Czech Republic and Estonia to transfer additional 
                                                 
74 Statewatch, US gains new advantages in the EU-USA PNR agreement, 12 September 2007. 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2007/sep/12 
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information on transatlantic passengers and allow armed air marshals on board in 
exchange for visa-free travel to America.  
 
Currently, the US Government refuses to grant visa-free access to the EU as a whole. 
Citizens from 15 of the EU 27 Member States can travel for short stays without a visa 
to the US under the Visa Waiver Program (VWP). It is a long-stated goal of the EU 
that all Member States be treated equally and received visa-free access. 
 
In August 2007 the US adopted new legislation which provided for the modernization 
of the VWP. The US proposed a draft Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to EU 
Member States individually covering the security provisions of this new legislation. 
But several conditions for the implementation of the VWP reform fall under the 
responsibility of the European Community to negotiate on the Member States' behalf.  
 
“We don't negotiate matters that are dealt with in Washington with the state of 
California. That would be disrespectful and we expect the United States to be 
similarly respectful of our law and system,”75 said the Commission's Director General 
for Justice and Security Jonathan Faull on 13 February 2008.  
 
Czech and Estonian governments confirmed they had talks with US officials, but they 
insisted they were taking EU law into account. However, within one year after the 
signing of PNR Agreement 2007, a small group of EU Member States signed up to 
their own MoU with the US in respect of visa waivers which could potentially 
jeopardise the protection afforded to passenger data collected in those countries and 
extend beyond the remit of data required to be provided under the PNR Agreement 
2007.  
 
                                                 
75 Charlemagne, America plays divide and rule, Economist.com, 14 February 2008. 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/certainideasofeurope/2008/02/america_plays_divide_and_rule.cfm 
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The Czech Republic's MoU with the US signed on 26 February 2008 provoked 
widespread concern. “In this MoU Czech authorities agreed to ‘passenger and other 
information sharing, screening information concerning known or suspected terrorists, 
information to combat terrorism and serious crime, and information on migration 
matters’ with the US authorities and also promised to ‘allow for the further 
dissemination of transferred information within the US Government’. Czech Ministry 
of Interior agreed ‘to provide identifying information that includes biographic and 
biometric data, to be used in determining whether persons who intend to travel to the 
United States represent a threat to the security, law enforcement, and immigration 
interests of the United States’. […] In the new MoU, the Czech Ministry of Interior 
declares its intention ‘to collect, analyze, use, and share API’ and ‘to collect, analyze, 
use, and share PNR’.”76  
 
Following the Czech Republic‘s MoU, similar bilateral documents were signed by 
other five new EU member countries: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary and 
Slovakia. 
 
The EU had to undertake some actions. On 18 April 2008 the European Council 
authorised the European Commission, on behalf of the European Community, to open 
negotiations with the US on certain conditions for access to the VWP. Such 
negotiations were supposed to be open to ensure that both tracks, the Community one 
and the national one, proceed in parallel, with the ultimate aim of all Member States 
taking part in VWP. 
 
The individual negotiation by Member States who are currently not members of VWP 
is weakening the united position of Member States as a whole, and it is a concern that 
                                                 
76 European Digital Rights, Czechs became Trojan horses for new US visa waiver programme, 26 
March 2008. http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number6.6/czech-us-visa-waiver 
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differing concessions are being made in MoU signed between Member States and the 
US. The US’ constant push for more personal data from the EU citizens continues. 
 
2.3.3 DHS Report 2008 and Real Life 
 
On 19 December 2008 DHS released a report concerning PNR information derived 
from flights between the US and the EU77. 
 
The authors of the report conclude that DHS handling of PNR data “is in compliance 
with both US law and the DHS-EU agreement on USA access to, and use of, PNR 
data related to flights between the EU and the USA.” 
 
However, according to the PNR Agreement 2007, there should be periodic joint US-
EU reviews of compliance, while the report was just a unilateral internal review 
conducted within the DHS, which did not include any EU representatives.  
 
The US human rights association Identity Project (IDP) published a condemnation on 
its website of a series of violations of the PNR Agreement 200778, in particular the 
enormous difficulties encountered by citizens wishing to exercise their right to access 
stored data concerning them (which are frequently sensitive, such as health data and 
meal preferences, etc.). 
 
IDP stated the following: 
 
                                                 
77 A report concerning Passenger Name Record Information derived from flights between the US and 
the European Union (18.12.2008). 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pnr_report_20081218. 
78 See: http://www.papersplease.org/wp/2008/12/24/dhs-admits-problems-in-disclosing-travel-
surveillance-records/#more-262 
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The DHS had legal obligations to US citizens and residents under the Privacy 
Act, and commitments to travellers from the EU under PNR Agreement 2007, 
to allow individuals timely access to PNR data about them held by the DHS. 
According to the report: 
“DHS policy allows persons (including foreign nationals) to access and seek 
redress under the Privacy Act to raw PNR data maintained in ATS”. 
Despite this, the DHS Privacy Office has now reported that: 
1. Requests for PNR data have typically taken more than a year to answer — 
many times longer than the legal time limits in the Privacy Act and Freedom 
of Information Act: “The requests for PNR took more than one year to 
process.” 
2. When individuals have requested “all data” about them held by the DHS, 
often they have not been given any of their PNR data: “If an individual 
requests ‘all information held by CBP’ the FOIA specialist generally does not 
search ATS because PNR was not specifically requested.” 
3. Because of this, the vast majority of requesters who should have received 
PNR data did not: “The PNR specific requests are a small percentage of the 
total requests based on the statistics provided to the Privacy Office, but if ATS 
were searched in all cases in which an individual asks for ‘all information held 
by CBP,’ the percentage would increase“ 
4. PNR data has been inconsistently censored before it was released: “The 
requests for PNR […] were inconsistent in what information was redacted.” 
5. A large backlog from the initial requests for PNR data remains unanswered, 
more than a year later: “Management noted that they have been understaffed 
and are bringing on new staff to reduce the backlog and period of time it takes 
to respond to requests. Additionally, management stated that part of the 
delayed response was due to the large number of requests initially submitted 
for PNR.” 
 
An example of such violations was the request in 2007 from MEP Sophia In 't Veld to 
get her PNR information. At first she received a claim from DHS that they did not 
have any record of her trip. The MEP finally received her PNR data after American 
lawyers filed a Federal lawsuit79 on her behalf, but the data was “late, clearly 
incomplete, and inconsistently and inappropriately redacted”80.  
 
                                                 
79 The full complaint: http://www.eff.org/files/int_veld_complaint.pdf. 
80 Edward Hasbrouck. Can you really see what records are kept about your travel? 30.12.2008.  
http://hasbrouck.org/blog/archives/001595.html. 
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Therefore, the report actually showed a number of weaknesses proving that the DHS 
has complied with neither the PNR Agreement 2007, nor the US law (especially, but 
not only, the Privacy Act) in its use of PNR data concerning US citizens as well as 
Europeans. 
 
CBP/DHS, when accessing PNR and secretly keeping copies of some of them in 
ATS, violated the Privacy Act which requires prior notice in the Federal Register, in 
specific form, of the existence, content, and usage of each system of records of 
personal information maintained by a US Federal agency. Only in 2006, after years of 
illegal operation outside the Privacy Act and EU laws and regulations, the CBP/DHS 
confirmed the existence of the ATS and US government retention of PNR data81. 
 
But what about the opportunity of getting records from the other side of the Atlantic? 
Under the Directive, the travellers have the right to see all of the records concerning 
them kept by companies, and to be told what data has been sent to other parties.  
 
But when one of American privacy advocates, Edward Hasbrouck, asked KLM Royal 
Dutch Airlines to see the records of one of his trips from the US to the EU and back, 
and to be told what third parties had accessed his records, they told him that no one 
had ever asked any European airline for those details before. KLM had no procedures 
for complying with the law regarding such case. After months KLM informed that:  
(i) they had outsourced the handling of his data to companies in the US;  
(ii) they did not know what data their contractors and agents had collected or 
retained, or with whom they might have shared the data; and  
(iii) they had no provisions in their contracts that would enable them to force 
their contractors to provide this information82. 
 
                                                 
81 http://www.papersplease.org/wp/2008/12/24/dhs-admits-problems-in-disclosing-travel-surveillance-
records/ 
82 See Edward Hasbrouck, supra n 80. 
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When Edward Hasbrouck asked the Dutch Data Protection Authority to intervene, it 
was the first formal request that they had received regarding airline reservations. 
They also admitted that they had no staff with the technical competence or industry 
knowledge to interpret the limited data that KLM had disclosed, or to assess the 
validity of KLM's claims. A year after the original request to KLM for travel records, 
the Dutch authorities informed they could not help, and that Edward Hasbrouck could 
do nothing more unless, within 45 days, hiring a lawyer in the Netherlands to prepare 
and file a private lawsuit, at his own expense, in Dutch, in a Dutch court, against the 
airline. 
 
Therefore, these real-world experiences prove that neither American nor Europeans 
can rely on DHS, airlines and travel companies’ compliance with the existing rules. 
Legal rights and promises with respect to travel records have proven unenforceable 
both in the US and the EU, for both US and EU citizens. 
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2.4 Proposed European PNR System and Other Plans 
 
Just a few days after the car bomb attack in Glasgow and London83, the 
Commissioner Franco Frattini announced that he would propose a new draft 
containing anti-terrorism measures, including creating a European PNR system. In his 
speech in front of MEPs he stated: “Up until now, PNR has been associated mostly 
with negotiations aimed at securing that EU citizens data are correctly processed by 
our partners and allies, in particular the United States. The Commission thinks the 
time has come to change focus and devote resources to the security of the Union. The 
Union is at least as much a potential target of a terrorist attack as the United States 
and the use and analysis of Passenger Name Records is an important law enforcement 
tool, to protect our citizens.“84.  
 
In November 2007, the EU announced the project85. The plan was similar to the PNR 
Agreement 2007. According to the proposal, airlines make available to the Member 
States 19 PNR data elements of their passengers. Such data must be made available 
only for flights to and from the EU (excluding intra-EU or domestic flights). EU 
carriers will be required to “push” the data to the Member States authorities. There 
will be two data transmissions, one 48 hours before the flight take off and one when 
the flight is all boarded. The recipient of the data in the Member States will be a 
Passenger Information Unit (PIU) to be designated in each Member State. PIU will 
make a “risk assessment” of the traveler, which could lead to the questioning or even 
refusal of the entry. PIU will share the results of such assessments with other PIU 
where necessary and retain the data for 5 years in an active database and for 8 years 
                                                 
83 On 29 June 2007, in London, two car bombs were discovered and disabled before they could be 
detonated. The Glasgow International Airport attack occurred on 30 June 2007.  
84 Franco Frattini. EU counter-terrorism strategy. European Parliament, Strasbourg, 5 September 2007. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/07/505. 
85 Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) for law 
enforcement purposes, Brussels, 28 November 2007. 
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in a dormant database. Airlines refusing to provide the requested data before take-off 
will be threatened with the withdrawal of their landing authorisation. 
 
Some Member States already adopted such measures at the national level. The 
proposal states that “once the EU framework is adopted and operational, it will 
provide all Member States and air carriers with a single and coherent legal 
environment in this field”. 
 
On the one hand, the draft makes references to the Framework Decision on Data 
Protection in criminal matters, which will govern all data processing under the 
proposal, as well as the transfers of data to third countries, stating that “no sensitive 
data will be used and there will be no enforcement action taken solely on the basis of 
the automatic processing of PNR”. Also, the draft mentions the Council Directive 
2004/82/EC, which provides that air carriers are obliged to communicate API to the 
competent authorities of the Member States, which are used for fighting illegal 
immigration. According to the Proposal’s text, “The added value of PNR is that it 
helps identify unknown people and develop risk indicators”. On the other hand, the 
draft makes no reference to the Data Protection Directive. 
 
The plan was criticized by the EP, the Article 29 Working Party and the EDPS, as 
well as by legal experts and human rights groups, who opposed the plan and found it 
a threat to privacy. 
 
In its Resolution of 12 July 2007 on the PNR agreement with the US, the EP stated 
that, since any PNR data in such a system may be made available to the DHS, the 
Commission must “clarify the state of play with regard to an EU PNR system, 
including making available the feasibility study it has pledged to undertake” 
(Paragraph 27). In Paragraph 28 the EP asked the Commission to substantiate: 
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a)  the operational need and purpose of collecting PNR data at the point of entry into 
EU territory; 
b) the added value of collecting PNR data in the light of the already existing control 
measures at the point of entry into the EU for security purposes, such as the Schengen 
system, the Visa Information System, and the API system; 
c) the use that is envisaged for PNR data, in particular whether it is for identifying 
individuals in order to ensure air security, for identifying who enters the territory of 
the EU, or for general negative or positive profiling of passengers. 
 
Article 29 Working Party expressed serious concerns in its press release dated 6 
December 200786. In its view, “The proposal is too closely modelled on the recently 
signed EU-US PNR agreement to be a balanced legal instrument”. 
 
In particular, the Working Party highlights the following shortcomings:  
• the proposal does not substantiate any legitimate basis for the collection of 
passenger data;  
• the amount of personal data collected is unreasonable;  
• the retention period of 13 years seems to be excessive; 
• inadequate filtering mechanisms and possible third-country transfers.     
 
The EDPS issued an opinion87 critical of the following elements:  
• insufficient justification of the legitimacy of the measures in view of the purpose 
of combating terrorism;  
• serious lack of legal certainty;  
• lack of clarity about the identification of the data recipients;  
• potential data transfers to third countries. 
                                                 
86 Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/news/docs/pr_05_12_07_en.pdf 
87 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the draft Proposal for a Council Framework 
Decision on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data for law enforcement Purposes (2008/C 
110/01). 
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 The European airlines criticized the proposal as well: “Despite assurances from the 
Commission that the proposal would not put any extra burden on airlines, because 
they already have all the information and are already required to communicate 
passport data to member states' competent authorities in order to fight illegal 
immigration, the AEA said the proposal fails to take account of the practical 
consequences for both European carriers and their passengers”88.  
 
According to AEA, “Commissioner Frattini's proposed decentralised system means 
that our carriers will have to comply with 27 different national data collection 
systems. We are talking about an operational and technical nightmare – and the 
Commission totally ignores the financial implications for the airline industry, which 
we haven't even started assessing yet.”89 
 
Nevertheless, some European member states, with the UK in the lead, wanted to go 
much further, proposing the following: 
• the European PNR system should cover not just flights in and out of the EU but 
also flights between EU countries plus all flights within each country; 
• the system should cover not just all flights but all sea and land travel as well; 
• the data and information gathered should be used not just for entry-exit but also for 
any law enforcement purpose90. 
 
                                                 
88 EurActiv.com. Association of European Airlines (AEA): European airline body dismayed at 
proposal for EU-PNR system, 9 November 2007. http://www.euractiv.com/en/transport/passenger-
screening-plan-nightmare-airlines/article-168216. 
89 Association of European Airlines. European airline body dismayed at proposal for EU-PNR system, 
08 November 2007. http://www.aea.be/assets/documents/press/Pr07-029.pdf 
90 Statewatch, Observatory: EU surveillance of passengers (PNR). http://www.statewatch.org/eu-
pnrobservatory.htm 
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As a result, in October 2008 the European Council started re-writing the proposal for 
an EU PNR scheme91. The key features of the EU PNR regime are still under 
negotiations and consideration.  
 
According to the draft text proposed on 17 April 2009, “This Framework Decision 
provides for the transfer or the making available by air carriers of PNR data of 
passengers of international flights to the Member States, for the purpose of 
preventing, detecting, investigating and prosecuting terrorist offences or serious 
crime, as well as the processing of those data, including their collection, use and 
retention by the Member States and their exchange between them”.  
 
Other important issues include: 
• The EU-PNR scheme would cover air traffic between the EU and third states, 
including transit passengers.  
• The retention period is three years (Article 9); it is indicated in a footnote that 
“no consensus has been reached yet on the question of the exact length of the 
additional retention period”. 
• PNR data and the analysis of PNR data may be transferred or made available 
by a Member State to a third country. 
• Since 27 EU countries have watch lists which are extremely different, the 
proposal suggests the necessity of developing ‘common methods and indicators’. 
• The choice of individual states to take the measure at the national level should 
be explicitly recognised. This means that actually the PNR will be collected by all 
Member States on all flights in and out of the EU and if a Member State wants to 
survey intra-community flights as well, it can very well do it. 
 
                                                 
91 See Council Decisions on Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the use of Passenger 
Name Record (PNR) data for law enforcement purposes: 13803/1/08 of 9 October 2008; 14592/08 of 
21 October 2008; 16457/08 of 28 November 2008; and 5618/1/09 of 17 April 2009. 
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In August 2008, the “Future Group” of Interior and Justice Ministers from six EU 
member states (Germany, France, Sweden, Portugal, Slovenia, and the Czech 
Republic) drafted a report suggesting a series of proposals “to boost EU integration in 
policing and intelligence-gathering, including the creation an EU-US Area of 
cooperation for ‘freedom, security and justice’”92:  
 
• EU Member States should pool information in a central intelligence unit, 
creating a network of “anti-terrorist centers”, standardising police surveillance 
techniques and extending the sharing of DNA and fingerprint databases to include 
CCTV video footage and material gathered by “spy drones”. 
• The European Gendarmerie Force should be expanded into an EU body that 
could be used for paramilitary intervention overseas. 
• Euro-Atlantic pact of cooperation with the US should be concluded. The 
document needs to be finalized by 2014 at the latest and would not just cover 
terrorism and passenger data but would cover the whole area of justice and home 
affairs – policing, immigration, sharing database data and biometrics.  
 
With regards to the pact, there can appear a problem due to the difference in privacy 
regulation between EU and US, but the US seems to push hard for this new pact. 
Bruno Waterfield, a correspondent for The Daily Telegraph has expressed the way in 
which security has been escalated to a level that he calls ‘securocracy’: “This concept 
heralds a new era by standardising European police surveillance techniques and 
creating ‘tool-pools’ of common data gathering systems to be operated at the EU 
level.”93 
                                                 
92 Report of the Informal High Level Advisory Group on the Future of European Home Affairs Policy 
(„The Future Group“), June 2008, available at: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/telegraph/multimedia/archive/00786/Read_the_full_EU_re_786870a.pdf  
93 Waterfield, Bruno, EU plan: The rise and rise of the securocrats, The Daily Telegraph, 7 August 
2008. 
http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/brunowaterfield/4841723/EU_plan_The_rise_and_rise_of_the_secur
ocrats/ 
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 The European Commission also proposed other new measures:  
 
• Creation of an entry/exit register of non-European visitors to the EU that will 
record the dates of entry and exit of each non-EU individual admitted to the Schengen 
visa-free area using biometric identifiers.  
• Introduction of a European Border Surveillance System that will use satellites 
and unmanned aircraft to check on the non-UE travellers on a short-stay visa and to 
track the movements of suspected illegal migrants. The system is already under 
construction and may be operational by 2012.  
 
Privacy advocates and MEPs criticized the proposals considering the EU is piling up 
databases without an overall strategy or a clear vision and believing the EC is only 
trying to copy the US in their practice to scan fingerprints and pictures of travellers. 
According to Meryem Marzouki, EDRI board member, “Europe is on its way towards 
a totalitarian society. As long as there is not adequate data protection under third 
pillar, there would be no limit to such plans.”94  
 
The European Commission representatives said that “a legislative proposal will 
follow”, but did not make any statements on when the systems would come into force 
and refrained from commenting upon criticisms to the lack of EU strategy in dealing 
with sensitive databases95. 
                                                 
94 European Digital Rights, Biometric data from non-EU travelers, 13 February 2008.  
http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number6.3/biometric-eu-travel 
95 See supra n 94. 
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3 Conclusion 
 
As we have discussed, the problems generally derive from the conflict between the 
US demands for access to information and the EU data protection compliance 
obligations. There seems to be no sign of either party giving up its position in the 
immediate future. The fight between EU and US has always been pushy from the side 
of the US, while EU has always been forced to make steps backwards. EU is trying to 
fend off US demands; when EU does not cave in the US simply negotiates bilateral 
deals with individual member states.  
 
The US’ point of view can be best illustrated by the following statement of Paul 
Rosenzweig, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy at the US DHS, expressed in 
November 2007 on the EU “adequacy” requirement: “The EU should reconsider its 
decision to apply notions of adequacy to the critical area of law enforcement and 
public safety. Otherwise the EU runs the very real risk of turning itself into a self-
imposed island, isolated from the very allies it needs“.96  
 
The US constantly insists that the scheme for transferring European airline-passenger 
data to US authorities is insufficient to fight terrorism. Every time the negotiations 
occur, the US demands more and more the detailed information, enhancing the 
sharing of data to more and more different US agencies, etc.  
 
The protection adequacy is the key issue for the EU, but as far as the US possesses 
economical measures and flights between the Atlantic apparently must go on, the US 
                                                 
96 Statewatch, Observatory on data protection in the EU, available at: 
http://www.statewatch.org/eu-dp.htm (detailed history of PNR data conflict). 
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can afford to be pushy, and we are not in the position to predict any change in this 
situation, at least in the nearest future. This fact makes the privacy issues dependant 
on the economic and political needs; thus, the higher standards of the EU privacy law 
with reference to data transfer to US can hardly be kept. For the time being, the US 
appears to be winning the battle of access to data. Its constant push for more personal 
data from EU citizens continues to be ahead of the EU tactical moves to protect its 
respective position.  
 
In fact, as long as the EU data protection laws exist, those companies that allowed 
PNR data without the knowledge and consent of data subjects to be sent to the US, 
have been in ongoing, systematic, routine, and flagrant violation of the EU Data 
Protection Directive and EU national data protection laws. Moreover, DHS, when 
accessing PNR and secretly keeping copies of some of them in ATS, violated the US 
Privacy Act. Since it would have been impossible for DHS to identify which PNR 
data had been collected in the EU, such access to PNR entailed further violations of 
EU law by the companies that allowed it without requiring the US government to 
obtain warrants or court orders for this data.  
 
The report released by the DHS in December 2008 as the result of a unilateral internal 
review conducted within the DHS, which included neither EU representatives nor any 
outside experts in PNR data, confirmed lack of compliance with both US and EU 
laws and showed that the DHS has not fulfilled its commitments to the US or EU 
travellers. 
 
Real-world experiences undertaken to see if a person can really be informed of his or 
her records that are being kept and processed, proved that no one can rely on existing 
compliance, enforcement, or oversight mechanisms both in the US and the EU, for 
both US and EU citizens. 
 
 66
The practice of PNR transfer was attempted to be legalized by method of concluding 
bilateral EU-US agreements. An initial agreement of 2004, nonbinding and 
unenforceable in the US, was ruled invalid by the European Court of Justice, without 
the court even reaching any of the issues of fundamental rights or adequacy in terms 
of data protection safeguards. A new agreement, also unenforceable in the US, was 
signed in 2007.  
 
The weakest points of the Agreement concern:  
• its legal force and effect 
• inadequate data protection standards 
• scope of the agreement uncertainty 
• lack of purpose limitation 
• “pull”/”push” system issues  
• unclear joint review procedure  
• extended retention period 
• enlarged list of data fields 
• sensitive data issues 
• API is not regulated 
• no clear list of US authorities entitled to access PNR 
• problem of enforcement of rights by the EU citizens 
• dependence on change in the US legislation, etc. 
 
The weaknesses were discovered and discussed broadly in public both before the 
Agreement had been entered and afterwards as well. There are doubts that those 
concerns had not been heard by the decision makers. But it must be remembered that 
they were under strong pressure from the US side and had shortage in time, since the 
Agreement was needed as soon as possible to avoid legal uncertainties for the EU 
Member States, air passengers and air carriers. In fact everyone involved in this case, 
including EU privacy advocates, admitted that it was preferable to have an agreement 
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with weaknesses and shortcomings, than not to have agreement at all, making it chaos 
for the air operation across the Atlantic. The Agreement thus was more a political 
solution than legal instrument. It will undoubtedly need further negotiations and 
revisions. 
 
Another problem is that the US is still trying to dictate tougher restrictions and get 
additional data transfer from EU Member States by pushing on them separately. For 
example, the US takes advantages of the situation that “old” and “new” EU Member 
States are unequal with regards to American visa policy. But the individual 
negotiation by Member States with US is weakening the united position of Member 
States as a whole. The EU is trying to handle with this, but as for now the results 
cannot be foreseen. 
 
Privacy advocates propose that Europeans should oppose any general agreement on 
the transfer of personal data from the EU to the US until the DHS has demonstrated 
that it is complying with the current PNR agreement. In the meantime, persons can 
exercise their right under EU law to request their PNR and other travel records from 
these travel companies.  Even if the DHS does not tell what information they have 
obtained, travel companies are required to tell who they have allowed to access the 
records, and what information they have given to government agencies or other third 
parties. If they do not, one can complain to national data protection authorities, or 
bring lawsuit in a European court. 
 
In the case of data processors that are subject to rules that require the provision of 
data to third parties irrespective of their obligations to the controllers of the data, the 
first step must always be to make the controller aware of the situation. However, this 
is easier said than done because any respectable service provider will be wary of 
doing anything that may highlight a breach of contract to its customer. 
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A key step that any organisation, either a controller or a processor, should be taking is 
the assessment of the conflict between the US demands for access to information and 
the EU data protection compliance obligations in their particular case. From a data 
protection perspective, a successful controller-processor relationship is one that can 
deal with this type of situation in an open and collaborative manner. A mutual and 
ongoing exchange of information about the parties’ legal duties should be regarded as 
one of the most important aspects of their relationship, not just because it will allow 
those parties to take any necessary pre-emptive action, but because it will be seen by 
the regulators as a clear sign that these matters are taken seriously. 
 
According to the guidelines laid down by the Article 29 Working Party (Opinion 
2/2007), the airlines should provide a simple but efficient data protection guarantee - 
tell passengers that information about their travel will be transferred to DHS. Of 
course, informing passengers upon data collection may not in itself legalise the 
transfer, but would enable them to make a conscious decision, whether they wished to 
give away their personal details or not.  
 
Another very important issue is as follows. Despite the above-mentioned concerns 
that the US demands violate the EU law and constitute threat to personal rights in 
general, in the meantime the EU itself is establishing its own PNR system using the 
PNR Agreement 2007 scheme as a model, and, moreover, plans to introduce other 
measures, including new surveillance systems, where such technologies as biometrics 
will be involved. From these undertakings we can see that the control and 
surveillance regime designed to struggle for security and prevent terrorism and crimes 
probably is going to prevail over privacy issues. According to the European 
Commission's Eurobarometer  surveys on data protection of January 2008, the 
majority of EU citizens (82%)97 seem to be ready to give up some of their rights and 
                                                 
97 Eurobarometers are ad hoc thematical telephone interviews to measure public opinion. The survey 
results are available at: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_225_sum_en.pdf 
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agree on the monitoring of PNR when this is aimed to combat terrorism (but with the 
reservation that the monitoring must be restricted to terrorism suspects).  
 
Unfortunately, the scope and purposes of such control can become broader and 
unlimited. After establishing European surveillance laws, the European Commission 
might be also seeking to create a global regime on passenger records surveillance, 
permitting all countries to gain access to this data. Thus, despite the fact that the EU 
is blaming the US for inadequate data protection standards, it can be going further 
than the US to establish a global system of surveillance. 
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Annex 1 
Abbreviations: 
ADIS - Arrival and Departure System  
AEA - Association of European Airlines  
API - Advanced Passenger Information  
APIS - Advanced Passenger Information System  
ATS - Automated Targeting System  
BCR - Binding Corporate Rules  
CAPPS - Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System  
CBP - Customs and Border Protection, US Bureau  
CoE - Council of Europe  
CRS - Computerized Reservation System  
DHS - Department for Homeland Security  
EC - European Community  
ECHR - European Convention on Human Rights  
ECJ - European Court of Justice  
ECTAA - European Travel Agents' and Tour Operators' Associations  
EDRI - European Digital Rights Initiative  
EDPS - European Data Protection Supervisor  
EEA - European Economic Area 
EFF - Electronic Frontier Foundation  
EGF - European Gendarmerie Force  
EP - European Parliament  
EU - European Union  
FOIA - Freedom Of Information Act  
HLCG - High Level Contact Group  
IATA - International Air Transportation Association  
ICAO - International Civil Aviation Organization  
IDP - Identity Project  
INS - Immigration and Naturalization Service  
MEP - Member of European Parliament  
MoU - Memorandum of Understanding  
PETs - Privacy-enhancing technologies  
PIU - Passenger Information Units  
PNR - Passenger Name Records  
TSA - Transportation Security Agency  
VWP - Visa Waiver Program  
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Annex 2 
 
Table to the Report on ‘Towards an International Infrastructure for Surveillance of Movement’ 
 
Issue US Law Requirement Original US Demands EU Privacy 
Requirements  
December 2003 
Settlement
Purpose of transfer 
and processing? 
'ensuring aviation safety 
and protecting national 
security' 
'serious criminal 
offences' 
Specific and 
proportionate; terrorism 
and serious related 
crime. 
'Terrorism and related 
crimes' and to 'other 
serious crimes, 
including organized 
crime, of a trans-
national nature' 
Sharing of Data? 
 
Beginning from the 
Customs Service, 'may 
be shared with other 
Federal agencies for the 
purpose of protecting 
national security' 
Shared with other 
Federal agencies for the 
purpose of protecting 
national security, or as 
otherwise authorized by 
law. 
Specific, on a case-by-
case basis 
Shared within the 
Department of 
Homeland Security, e.g. 
used in development of 
TSA's CAPPS system. 
Otherwise still very 
unclear, although DHS 
has apparently promised 
'no bulk sharing with 
other agencies'. 
How to Access Data? 'carriers shall make 
passenger name record 
information available to 
the Customs Service 
upon request.' 
On-line access to 
Airline databases to 
'pull' whatever 
information they wish. 
Includes access to non-
US related travel. 
Must be limited to what 
is strictly necessary, and 
limited access to 
sensitive information. 
Sharing only upon 
consent. 
Tentative statements 
regarding 'push', 
possibly through a 
centralised EU 
institution. Possible 
reciprocity for the EU. 
Breadth of Access to 
Information? 
'PNR' Broad, at the discretion 
of US Customs, 
includes non-US travel 
information. Estimated 
50-60 fields. 
Must be limited to what 
is strictly necessary; no 
access to sensitive 
information. Mostly 
information available on 
ticket and itinerary. 
34 fields. Sensitive data 
to be filtered by an EU 
institution that will also 
grant access to EU 
member states. 
Automated Processing 
and Profiling? 
Unclear.  Data to be used within 
CAPPS II. 
Not possible unless 
'logic' of system is 
understood. 
Leave for future 
agreement; even as 
European passenger 
data records are being 
used to develop the 
system. 
Retention Period? Undeclared in law. 50 years. 72-hours according to 
EU regulations, retained 
for 3 years for billing-
disputes only. At most, 
'a short period'; 'not 
more than some weeks, 
or even months'.  
3.5 years. 
Right of Redress?  none None promised. 'Provide support and 
help to individual data 
subjects in their exercise 
of rights' including 
access to data, and 
Appropriate redress 
mechanisms for 
individuals'. Called for 
judicial or extra-judicial 
(independent) redress 
mechanisms. 
CPO in DHS; possibly 
with EU Data Protection 
Authorities representing 
EU citizens. 
Compliance Reviews?  None None promised. Must be ongoing 
verification of 
compliance. 
Yearly with the co-
operation of the EU. 
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PNR Data Elements Required by CBP from Air Carriers  
(Undertakings 2004, Attachment “A”): 
 
1. PNR record locator code 
2. Date of reservation 
3. Date(s) of intended travel 
4. Name 
5. Other names on PNR 
6. Address 
7. All forms of payment information 
8. Billing address 
9. Contact telephone numbers 
10. All travel itinerary for specific PNR 
11. Frequent flyer information (limited to miles flown and address(es)) 
12. Travel agency 
13. Travel agent 
14. Code share PNR information 
15. Travel status of passenger 
16. Split/Divided PNR information 
17. Email address 
18. Ticketing field information 
19. General remarks 
20. Ticket number 
21. Seat number 
22. Date of ticket issuance 
23. No show history 
24. Bag tag numbers 
25. Go show information 
26. OSI information 
27. SSI/SSR information 
28. Received from information 
29. All historical changes to the PNR 
30. Number of travelers on PNR 
31. Seat information 
32. One-way tickets 
33. Any collected APIS information 
34. ATFQ fields 
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 D
Types of EU PNR Collected  
(PNR Agreement 2007): 
 
1. PNR record locator code 
2. Date of reservation/ issue of ticket 
3. Date(s) of intended travel 
4. Name(s) 
5 Available frequent flier and benefit information (i.e., free tickets, upgrades, etc.) 
6. Other names on PNR, including number of travelers on PNR 
7. All available contact information (including originator information) 
8. All available payment/billing information (not including other transaction details linked 
to a credit card or account and not connected to the travel transaction) 
9. Travel itinerary for specific PNR 
10. Travel agency/travel agent 
11. Code share information 
12. Split/divided information 
13. Travel status of passenger (including confirmations and check-in status) 
14. Ticketing information, including ticket number, one way tickets and Automated Ticket 
Fare Quote 
15. All Baggage information 
16. Seat information, including seat number 
17. General remarks including OSI, SSI and SSR information 
18. Any collected APIS information 
19. All historical changes to the PNR listed in numbers 1 to 18 
 
 
